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Abstract.  The central allocative decision confronting a judge in a nuisance dispute
should not concern the identity of the initial entitlement recipient but rather the
identity of the more efficient chooser—the litigant who can more efficiently allocate
the entitlement.  We show that liability rules can produce four basic allocations
which differ centrally in the ways in which courts delegate to litigants the authority
to ultimately allocate the entitlement.  Two classes concern “single chooser” rules
that vest (in the absence of an agreement to the contrary) the allocative decision
solely in one of the litigants.  The other two classes concern a new type of rule,  “dual
chooser” rules, that allow either party to veto the transfer of an entitlement.  Dual-
chooser rules are more than a theoretical curiosity both because they exist in our
current law and because at times they produce systematically greater allocative
efficiency than either type of single-chooser rule.  Two heads are sometimes better
than one.
A central result of the paper is that in choosing among different liability rules
allocative concerns can be decoupled from distributive concerns.  There exist an
infinite number of liability rules which produce each of the four basic allocations,
but every rule within a particular class divides differently between the litigants the
expected value of the allocation.  To successfully decouple, courts should at times
impose "call option," "put option,” "Pay or be Paid," and "Pay or Pay" rules.
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1Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
2Entitlements are often protected from intentional takings by property rules, but from
negligent takings with liability rules.  Hence, it is a criminal offense to intentionally break your
neighbor’s arm (i.e., her arm is protected by a property rule with regard to your intentional taking),
but the neighbor is entitled to compensatory damages if you break her arm through mere negligence
(i.e., her arm is protected by a liability rule with regard to your negligent taking).
OPTIMAL DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING IN THE DESIGN OF LIABILITY RULES
INTRODUCTION
Calabresi and Melamed began a scholarly revolution by seeing that legal entitlements have
two readily distinguishable types of protection:  property rules and liability rules.1  These two
archetypal forms protect an entitlement holder’s interest in markedly different ways -- via deterrence
and compensation.  Property rules protect entitlements by trying to deter others from taking.
Liability rules protect entitlements not by deterring but by trying to compensate the victims of non-
consensual takings.2  Accordingly, the compensatory impetus behind liability rules causes such
remedies to focus on the takee’s welfare, while the deterrence impetus behind property rules causes
such remedies to focus on the potential taker’s welfare.  Thus, disgorgement and prison terms are
traditional property rule remedies, while expectation and other compensatory damages fall squarely
in the liability rule camp.
Seeing liability rules as a distinct category of entitlement allowed Calabresi and Melamed
to see that there was a missing category in the ways courts resolved nuisance disputes.  Consider the
classic, if somewhat idealized, nuisance dispute between a single “Polluter” and a single “Resident”
who is discomforted by the pollution.  Prior to One View of the Cathedral, courts had traditionally
chosen among three different judgments:
Rule 1: a court might issue an injunction against a Polluter;
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3The term “initial” entitlement is used to convey the idea that because of a subsequent taking
the ultimate entitlement to control whether or not pollution will take place may belong to a taker.
4Rule 1, for example, represents a decision in which the initial entitlement is granted to the
resident and this entitlement is protected by a property rule.  The polluter is deterred from a non-
consensual taking by the prospect of being held in contempt.  In contrast, Rule 2 represents a
decision in which the initial entitlement is granted to the resident, but it is only protected by a less-
stringent, compensation-based liability rule.  Under Rule 2, the polluter might non-consensually take
the resident’s entitlement and pay compensatory damages.  Rule 2 was famously deployed in Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).  Finally, Rule 3, by finding the pollution
not to be a nuisance, effectively grants the initial entitlement to the polluter and protects it by a
property rule.
2
Rule 2: a court might find nuisance but permit pollution to continue if the Polluter
chose to pay damages; or 
Rule 3: a court might find the pollution not to be a nuisance and permit the Polluter
to continue without paying damages.
Appreciating the difference between liability and property rules, the authors saw that these three
approaches naturally fit into a two-by-two box.  In this stylized box (shown in Table 1), the court
determines (i) whether the resident or the polluter has the initial entitlement (to control whether or
not there will be pollution),3 and (ii) whether this entitlement is protected by property or a liability
rule.4
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5In a recent symposium honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of One View of the Cathedral,
see 106 YALE L.J. 2083-2213 (1997), Calabresi pointed out that James Atwood had discussed the
possibility of a Rule 4-like outcome in a student note that he published in the Stanford Law Review
three years before Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis.  See Guido Calabresi, Remarks:  The Simple
Virtues of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201, 2204 (1997) (citing James R. Atwood, Note, An
Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 293, 315 (1969)).
6Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (Cameron,
V.C.J).  The court’s unconditional order seems different than the definition of Rule 4 in the text
which gives the Resident the choice of whether (a) to pay to stop further pollution or (b) not to pay
3
Table 1: Calabresi and Melamed’s Two-By-Two Box with the Missing Category
Method of Protection










Resident Rule 1 Rule 2
Polluter Rule 3 [Rule 4]
The problem with the traditional tripartite approach to resolving nuisance disputes is that one of the
boxes was empty.  Calabresi and Melamed’s theory suggested a fourth approach:
Rule 4: a court might permit a Polluter to continue unless the Resident chose to pay
the Polluter damages in order to enjoin further pollution.5
As fate would have it, the fourth box would not long stay empty.  In Spur Industries v. Del Webb,
Justice James D. Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court—in what has probably become the most
cited “coming to the nuisance” decision—found that pollution could be enjoined, but that a
developer representing residents had to “indemnify [the Polluter] for a reasonable amount of the cost
of moving or shutting down.”6  Calabresi and Melamed’s good fortune in identifying a vacuum that
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and to allow the Polluter to continue polluting.  To harmonize the case with the definition, it is
necessary to speculate about what would have happened if Del Webb had petitioned the court to void
its order enjoining the pollution as well as its order that Del Webb indemnify Spur.  If we believe
that the court would have in effect allowed Del Webb to withdraw its initial complaint, it would have
in effect been giving Del Webb the Rule 4 choice—that is, the choice of paying to stop pollution or
not paying and allowing the pollution to continue.  Alternatively, at a minimum, future developers
will realize that suing in this jurisdiction may be choosing to pay for an injunction.
7Indeed, there are probably a dozen other articles that aver in one way or another to this
history.  See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:  Covenants, Nuisance Rules and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab,
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442
(1995).
8Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854-56 (1993).
9Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 470-75; Ian Ayres &
J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions:  Property Rules, Liability Rules and Beyond, 106
YALE. L.J. 703, 729-33 (1996); Richard Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral:  The Dominance
of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies:  Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149 (1997); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997); Ian Ayres, The 1998 Monsanto Lecture:  Protecting Property
with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
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was almost simultaneously filled helped solidify their article’s well-deserved fame.
This narrative is well known to the vast majority of tort (and property) professors.7  However,
the legal academy seems to be much less aware of an analogous phenomenon that has been
developing over the last decade.  Starting  in 1993 with Madeline Morris’s article, The Structure of
Entitlement,8 a group of about a half dozen scholars have started to see “liability rule” protection as
a type of call option.9  Just as the property/liability rule distinction helped Calabresi and Melamed
discover the missing Rule 4, the call option reconceptualization of the two liability rules (Rules 2
and 4) naturally led to consideration of two additional “put option” liability rules.
A call option is an option to buy.  The option holder can force a sale at the exercise price
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10Property rules (Rules 1 and 3) can also be easily fitted into option framework.  From an
option perspective, the only difference between protecting an entitlement with a property rule and
a liability rule is a difference in the potential taker’s exercise price.  Property rules set the exercise
price so high that no option holder would choose to exercise the option.  See Ayres & Talley, supra
note 9, at 1048.
11Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).
12Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
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even if the seller does not want to sell.  Rules 2 and 4 have just this “call” quality.  Under Rule 2,
the Polluter has a call option—the choice to pay damages—the choice, in effect, to buy the
Resident’s right to clean air and, therefore, to be able to continue polluting.  The Resident begins
with the initial entitlement (to stop pollution), but the Polluter can force the Resident to sell this right
for a judicially determined amount.  Rule 4 reverses the identity of the Polluter and Resident.  Under
Rule 4, the Polluter has the initial entitlement, and the Resident has the call option.  The Resident
can force the Polluter to sell this right to pollute for a judicially determined amount.10
Once the traditional liability rules were reconceived as granting a potential taker a call option,
it became almost inevitable that scholars would wonder whether “put option” rules might not also
be desirable.  A put option is an option to sell.  While call options give the option holder the choice
of whether to pay a non-negotiated amount (the exercise price), put options give the option holder
the choice of whether to be paid a non-negotiated amount.  Call options when exercised give rise to
“forced sales”; put options give rise to “forced purchases.”
Rule 2 gives the Polluter the choice of whether to pay; Rule 4 gives the Resident the choice
of whether to pay.  Scholars thinking about the classic Rule 2 and Rule 4 cases—Boomer11 and
Spur12—have often focused only on the difference between who pays, but a second dimension exists
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
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of who chooses to force the payment.  Rules 2 and 4 concern a choice to pay, while the put options
concern the choice to be paid.  
Applied to nuisance disputes, the possibility of put options suggests two additional rules.
Each rule gives the initial entitlement holder a put option—the option to force a non-consensual
purchase by the other side:
Rule 5: a court might allow a Polluter to continue polluting, but also give the Polluter
the choice to stop polluting and to receive damages from the Resident; and
Rule 6: a court might allow a Resident to enjoin pollution, but also give the Resident
the option of waiving his injunctive rights in return for damages from the
Polluter.
These “put option” rules—like their “call option” counterparts—are still “liability rules,” the  goal
of which is to compensate the initial entitlement holder for any non-consensual transfer, rather than
to deter such a transfer in the first place.  The only difference is that with put options the initial
entitlement holder can force the non-consensual transfer, whereas with the more traditional (call
option) liability rule the non-entitlement holder can force the transfer.
Table 1 can be expanded as shown in Table 2 to help flesh out the underlying structure of the
six rules:
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
13Some authors have reversed the labels of Rules 5 and 6, see, e.g., Levmore, supra note 9,
at 2163; Ayres, supra note 9, at 797 n.9, but to do so destroys the symmetry of Calabresi and
Melamed’s original categorization.
7








“Put Option” or “Force
Purchase” Rule
(Initial Entitlement
Holder Also Has Put














Resident Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 6
Polluter Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5
The two new “put option” rules—Rules 5 and 6—are similar, except that under Rule 5 the Polluter
has the initial entitlement and a put option, whereas under Rule 6 the Resident has the initial
entitlement and a put option.13  The rules in the three columns of the table differ only as to which
party has the option to force a non-consensual transfer of the initial entitlement:  under a property
rule, neither side has an option to force a transfer; under a traditional liability rule, the non-
entitlement holder has an option to force the initial entitlement holder to sell; and under a “put
option” rule, the entitlement holder has the option to force the non-entitlement holder to purchase.
While “put option” rules have not been used to resolve nuisance disputes, put option awards
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
14Ayres, supra note 9, at 800.
15See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:  An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Ayres, supra note 9.
16See Levmore, supra note 9, at 2168-72; Ayres, supra note 9, at 801-13; Krier & Schwab,
supra note 7.
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are a standard response to intentional taking in other areas of tort law:
Contrary to accepted wisdom, the common law does use “put options”—the right to
force a non-consensual purchase—as a mechanism for protecting entitlements:  (1)
if Calabresi steals Melamed’s watch, Melamed has the option of suing to recover the
watch (replevin) or suing to receive the watch’s value (trover); (2) if Calabresi is a
holdover tenant in Melamed’s apartment, Melamed has the option of suing to enjoin
Calabresi’s continuing trespass or (at least in some jurisdictions) suing to force
Calabresi to rent for up to an entire additional year; and (3) if Calabresi builds an
encroaching wall on Melamed’s land, Melamed has the option of suing to force
Calabresi to remove the wall or suing to force Calabresi to permanently buy the
encroached land.  In each of these examples, after Calabresi takes Melamed’s
entitlement, the common law gives Melamed a put option—the option to choose
court-determined damages (for permanently ceding the entitlement to the defendant)
or injunctive relief (to reacquire the entitlement).14
In the nuisance context, instead of giving an Atlantic Cement the (call option) choice of deciding
whether to pay to pollute [Rule 2], a court might give a Boomer the (put option) choice of whether
to be paid (and bear continued pollution) or to refuse payment (and win an injunction against
continued pollution) [Rule 6].
Scholars have already made some important progress in identifying and analyzing these four
liability rules.  We now know, for example, that courts should set damages under any of four liability
rules (2, 4, 5 or 6) equal to the court’s best estimate of the non-option holder’s value.15  And authors
have put forward a series of reasons why “put option” rules might at times dominate “call option”
rules.16  But to date there has been very little analysis of a very basic question:  who should be given
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
17RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979).
18See infra at 33.
19The separate and important question of whether and under what conditions liability rules
dominate (or are dominated by) property rules has recently been discussed by Ayres & Talley, supra
note 9; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules
Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric
Talley, Distinguishing Between Concensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105
YALE L.J. 235 (1995); Epstein, supra note 9.
In the conclusion, we return to this issue and show how the analysis of this article also
enriches our knowledge of when property rules are likely to be superior to liability rules.  See infra
at 111.
9
the initial entitlement?  Most authors—if they address this question at all—suggest that courts should
grant the initial entitlement to the litigant it believes to have the higher valuation.  This standard is
codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which expressly directs courts in deciding whether
or not an act constitutes a nuisance to consider whether “the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility
of the actor’s conduct.”17  As we will see,18 the idea of simply giving the entitlement to the higher
valuer—while making eminent sense in terms of maximizing allocative efficiency when choosing
between property rule regimes (Rules 1 and 3) —does not make sense when choosing among the
four liability rules (Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6).
At its core, this article uses mathematical reasoning in an attempt to provide practical advice
on how judges should choose among liability rules.19  We both expand and simplify the range of
judicial choice.  We expand judicial choice by showing that there exist an infinite number of
implementations within two foundational classes of liability rules that can produce the same
allocative efficiency as those four liability rules.  While any rule within a particular class identically
allocates the entitlement among the litigants, this proliferation of rules is far from redundant because
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
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the liability rules divide the expected total payoff differently.   A central finding of this article is to
show how judges can decouple allocative and distributive concerns.  A court's decisions about which
type of rule will maximize ex post allocative efficiency does not need to affect its decision about
which distribution will best promote equity or ex ante investment.
Our analysis also simplifies judicial choice by revealing a deeper structure to liability rules.
Maximizing allocative efficiency has nothing to do with a court’s decision about who is given an
initial entitlement.  We will show, for example, that Rule 2—which gives the initial entitlement to
the Resident (subject to the Polluter’s call option)—produces identical allocations for every possible
realization of Polluter and Resident valuations as Rule 5—which gives the initial entitlement to the
Polluter (along with a put option).  To maximize allocative efficiency, courts should focus instead
on delegating the allocation choice to the litigant who is the more efficient chooser.  
While from the perspective of the initial entitlement holder, liability rules seem to have
compensation as its central aim, from an efficiency perspective liability rules are a means by which
an imperfectly informed court can delegate allocative choice to private litigants who potentially have
superior allocative information.  For example, a traditional liability rule (Rule 2) can be seen as the
court delegating the allocative choice to the polluter.  The Polluter chooses whether to allocate the
entitlement to itself (and to pay damages to the Resident) or to allocate the entitlement to the
Resident (and pay nothing).  In this article, we provide a theory of how courts might optimally
delegate allocative choice. 
 The four liability rules of Table 2 (Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6) give rise to just two allocative
equilibria corresponding to the identity of the chooser.  For convenience, we call these “single
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
20Under Rule 2, it is the Polluter’s (call option) choice either to pollute and pay damages or
to refrain from polluting and pay nothing; under Rule 5 it is the Polluter’s (put option) choice either
to refrain from polluting and receive damages or to pollute and receive nothing.  Under either rule,
the Resident is powerless to affect the ultimate allocation except by bargaining with the Polluter in
the shadow of these Polluter choice laws.
21Jack Balkin and Ian Ayres have previously analyzed second-order liability rules which, like
dual-chooser liability rules, give both litigants a say in the ultimate allocation.  See Ayres & Balkin,
supra note 9.  But unlike second (or higher) order rules which require successively higher exercise
prices, the dual-chooser rules that are the focus of this article concern judges setting a single exercise
price that both litigants react to.  The relationship between the dual-chooser rules and second order
rules is discussed more fully infra Part III.
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chooser” rules because a single litigant determines the entitlement’s final allocation.  Rules 2 and
5 are “defendant choice” rules because they give the polluter the allocative choice,20 while Rules 4
and 6 are “plaintiff choice” rules that give the Resident the allocative choice.  There is a continuum
of defendant-choice rules and a continuum of plaintiff-choice rules, but all the defendant-choice rules
(including Rules 2 and 5) allocate the entitlement identically and only differ in the amount of the side
payments that are made between the parties.  Likewise, there is a continuum of plaintiff-choice rules
(including Rules 4 and 6) that identically allocate the entitlement, albeit with different side payments.
But we also show that there are two further foundational classes of liability rules.  We dub
these “dual chooser” rules in contradistinction to the single-chooser rules, because both the plaintiff
and the defendant have a potential impact on how the entitlement is ultimately allocated.21  One class
of allocation rules gives the entitlement to the plaintiff unless both parties agree to shift it (for a
court-determined price) to the defendant—in other words, either party has the power to veto the
defendant being allocated the entitlement.  We will call this class of rules “defendant-joint-veto”
rules.  The other class of allocations concern rules that allow either party unilaterally to veto the
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
22Madeline Morris is the only other person to have considered “dual chooser” regimes.  See
Morris, supra note 8, at 854.  She mentions in passing the theoretical possibility of such rules, but
she does not identify circumstances when they might be advisable nor does she suggest their
arguable existence in current legal practice.  
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plaintiff being allocated the entitlement—which we will analogously label “plaintiff-joint-veto”
rules.  As with the single-chooser rules, we will give multiple option interpretations of these dual-
chooser rules and show that there are an infinite number of rules within each of these classes that
produce identical entitlement allocations, but which affect how the disputants divide the
entitlement’s value.
In one sense, these dual-chooser rules represent a kind of centralized planning writ small.
Under them, the government (i.e., a judge) sets a price for the entitlement and then asks both litigants
whether they want to trade at that price.  While this characterization makes the dual-chooser rules
seem esoteric and unworldly, we argue that these rules are already being used in some legal contexts.
Moreover, we show conditions under which a dual-chooser rule systematically produces greater
allocative efficiency than either class of single-chooser rules.22
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  Entitlement Allocated to Defendant







(a) Plaintff-Choice Allocation (b) Defendant-Choice Allocation
(c) Defendant Joint Veto (d) Plaintiff Joint Veto
Our four core allocative equilibria are graphically depicted in the stylized panels of Figure
1.  The panels show the range of possible plaintiff valuations on the horizontal axis and the range




allocating the entitlement to
the defendant whenever the
defendant’s value was
higher than the plaintiff’s
value.  A fully informed
judge would accordingly
use a decision rule
corresponding to the
dashed diagonal lines in the
panels.
But an imperfectly
informed judge instead can resort to liability rules to harness the litigants’ superior private
information about at least their own values.23  As shown in panel (a), the class of plaintiff-choice
rules allows the plaintiff to vertically partition the valuation space.  Under these rules, when the
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plaintiff values the entitlement more than the damage amount, it will allocate the entitlement to
itself; when the plaintiff values the entitlement less than the damage amount, it will allocate the
entitlement to the defendant.
The analogous horizontal allocative partition produced by defendant-choice rules is shown
in panel (b).  For this class of rules, the defendant is vested with the power to allocate the entitlement
to itself when its valuation exceeds the damage amount, or to allocate the entitlement to the plaintiff
when its valuation falls short of judicially chosen damages.  While not achieving first-best (perfect
information) allocative efficiency, these single-chooser rules can enhance allocative efficiency by
giving the chooser an incentive to make the most efficient allocation given her available information
(i.e., that she knows her own valuation precisely but only, like the court, knows the probability
distribution of her rival’s valuation).
The allocations for the dual-chooser rules are depicted in panels (c) and (d).  Panel (c) shows
the defendant-joint-veto allocation, in which the entitlement is allocated to the plaintiff unless both
parties opt for a defendant allocation.  A defendant allocation will only take place if the plaintiff’s
valuation is less than the damage amount and the defendant valuation is greater than the damage
amount.  This is because if the plaintiff’s valuation is above the damage amount then the plaintiff
will choose to allocate the entitlement to itself and forego the payment of damages it would have
received if the entitlement were allocated to the defendant.  If the defendant’s valuation is below the
damage amount the defendant will allocate the entitlement to the plaintiff rather than pay the higher
damage amount.  Panel (d) shows the analogous plaintiff-joint-veto allocation, which allocates the
entitlement to the defendant unless the both parties opt for a plaintiff allocation.
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24In this article, we generally distinguish between “allocation” of the entitlement at hand and
“distribution” of wealth or value.
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All four equilibria allocate the upper left quadrant to the defendant and the lower right
quadrant to the plaintiff.  But there are two crucial differences.  First, the optimal damage amounts
for the particular classes of rules may differ.  We will show that the optimal damages for all the rules
within a class are the same, but that optimal damages may differ among the classes.  One of our tasks
in this article will be to derive the optimal damages for each of the four classes.
Second, a crucial difference between allocative equilibria concern the off-diagonal quadrants
(i.e., the lower-left and upper-right quadrants).  The dual-chooser rules allocate both of these off-
diagonal quadrants to the same litigant, while the single-chooser rules split ownership by quadrant.
To determine which of the four basic liability classes maximizes allocative efficiency, a court in
effect will need to determine which litigant is likely to be the more efficient entitlement holder
within these off-diagonal quadrants.  Accordingly, a second task of the article is to provide guidance
for judges determining which of the four equilibria depicted in Figure 1 maximizes allocative
efficiency (conditional on the judges’ imperfect information).
Our finding that there are an infinite number of rules within each class that vary in how the
expected total payoffs are divided between the litigants allows courts to decouple the allocative and
distributive decisions.24  Courts deciding among this expanded set of liability rules should first
choose the class of rule that maximizes ex post allocative efficiency and then choose the
implementation within the class that best comports with the distributive demands of equity or the
need to produce ex ante investment incentives.  
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25Even after the parties have produced evidence of their respective valuations, we imagine
that the court will still have residual uncertainty about the true valuations of the entitlement.  Some
of this uncertainty may relate to inevitable uncertainty about the future (e.g., will the factory’s new
machine work?), while other uncertainty may simply be the by-product of litigants’ strategic
incentive to misrepresent their valuations (e.g., “I really value this land because my dog is buried
here”).
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The core allocative decision is for a judge to decide the optimal number and identity of the
choosers.  The choice among these four allocative equilibria will turn on judicial beliefs about how
much the litigants value the entitlement at issue.  But instead of being based simply on which litigant
has the higher mean value, we show that the allocation decision should turn more broadly on judicial
beliefs as to how these values are distributed.25
We will show that dual-chooser allocations will at times dominate single-chooser allocations
and at other times be dominated by them.  Dual-chooser rules can dominate if neither litigant is well
placed to make a "nuanced" decision by herself. When single-chooser rules tend to always allocate
the entitlement to the same litigant (what we term a "non-nuanced" decision), there is a greater
opportunity for dual-chooser rules to improve allocative efficiency.  Even though it may seem from
the perspective of an individual litigant, that the plaintiff or the defendant is always likely to be the
higher valuer, dual chooser rules may allow the litigants together to identify instances when the other
side ends up with a higher value.  Under these circumstances, two heads can be better than one.
Single-chooser rules can dominate, however, when the court has relatively good information
about one of the litigant’s valuation.  A court should delegate allocative authority to litigants who
have an informational advantage over the imperfectly informed court.  Somewhat counter-intuitively,
it is the litigant who—from the court’s perspective—has a less speculative valuation that is the less
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26James Krier and Stewart Schwab have the best modern discussion of how courts should
respond to numerosity problems in choosing among liability rules.  See Krier & Schwab, supra note
7.
27See, e.g., Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977) (pollution
from ConEd plant disrupted adjacent new car preparation business); Estancias Dallas Corp v. Shultz,
500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App. 1973) (air conditioner noise reduced value of single adjacent residence).
The class of cases dealing with visual nuisances is particularly likely to involve a single plaintiff and
a single defendant.  See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. 114 So. 2d
357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (hotel addition obstructed view of adjacent hotel); Amphitheaters, Inc.
v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Or. 1948) (light from night-time dog track interfered with
adjacent drive-in movie).
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able to make an allocative choice.  A litigant with less-speculative value has a smaller informational
advantage vis-à-vis both the court and her rival (who has the more speculative damages).  Single-
chooser rules can dominate dual-chooser rules when it is inefficient to give a litigant who knows
little more than court partial control over who will end up with the entitlement.  When a single-
chooser rule is optimal, judges should give the choice to the litigant who has from the court’s
perspective more speculative valuation.  We will show that the choice between the two single-
chooser rules tends to turn not on which litigant’s valuation has a higher mean, but rather on which
litigant’s valuation has, from the judges’ perspective, a higher variance.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to emphasize four qualifications to our option
approach concerning numerosity, autarky, intentionality, and value correlation.  First, we model
disputes between only two litigants.  Many nuisance examples concern a single source whose
pollution adversely affects multiple residents (à la Boomer or Spur).26  Still, there are scores of cases
in which the nuisance centrally involves a dispute between only two people.27  And even multiple
plaintiff cases can be modeled in a bilateral fashion if the plaintiff class is sufficiently unified.  More
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28Rose characteristically hits the nail on the head when she explains that:  “Ayres [is]
interested in situations in which two parties are stuck with each other, ‘thin’ markets instead of
‘thick’ ones.  Neighboring landowners seem to fit that bill.”  Rose, supra note 9, at 2183.
29See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373 (1999).
30See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 228-29.  The persistence conjecture predicts that
a liability rule that has a non-consensual efficiency advantage under conditions of autarky (i.e., high
bargaining costs) will continue to be more efficient when the costs of bargaining are lower. 
According to Kaplow and Shavell, non-consensual headstarts in efficiency will tend to persist when
bargaining is possible.  Id.  However, while not denying a persistence effect, we believe that different
liability rules themselves can induce different types of information disclosure and thereby affect the
relative efficiency of rules independent of the autarkic or non-consensual effect on allocative
efficiency.  See Ayres & Talley, supra note 19.
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fundamentally, our models assume that the litigants are the only relevant contenders for the role of
highest valuer of the entitlement.  Our option approach is a powerful way to analyze what economists
call "bilateral monopoly,"28 but it is important to remember that in many circumstances there will
be third parties who will want to enter the notional bidding to possess the entitlement.
Second, our analysis investigates the allocative efficiency of different liability rules in the
absence of bargaining (i.e. under conditions of “autarky”).  This is a restrictive assumption because
we should expect that in many instances the litigants will bargain in the shadow of the law.  Still,
our autarky assumption is supported by recent empiricism which suggests that real world nuisance
disputants almost never bargain after courts render judgment.29  Moreover, as argued by Louis
Kaplow and Steve Shavell, there are reasons to expect that the relative efficiency of different liability
regimes when bargaining is not allowed will tend to persist even when bargaining is allowed.30
Third, the option model is primarily concerned with circumstances of intentional taking.
While this often (if not usually) describes nuisance disputes, it is important to remember that liability
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31However, with regard to visual nuisance, correlated valuations are more likely.  For
example, new structures often derive much of their value from the good views they obstruct.  See,
e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel, 114 So. 2d at 357.
32See infra at 103.
33Carol Rose has acutely observed that Ayres’s previous option analysis has a contractual
shadow as its paradigmatic example:  “The contractual relationship has only a discrete number of
parties—paradigmatically two—who . . . are stuck with each other.”  Rose, supra note 9, at 2187.
Rose is clearly right that contractual renegotiations often involve limited numbers and a bilateral
monopoly. 
34See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 745.  But while contract renegotiations may serve as
a paradigm case of bilateral monopoly, they are not the only example. 
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rules are often (if not usually) applied in circumstances of negligent taking.  And, finally, we assume
that the litigants’ valuations are uncorrelated—meaning that an unusually high entitlement valuation
for the plaintiff does not entail an unusually high entitlement valuation for the defendant.  This is
often true in nuisance suits where the economic benefit to the polluter is orthogonal to the non-
economic detriment to the resident.31
These restrictive assumptions somewhat limit the applicability of our analysis.  But as
stressed below,32 there are still a rich set of circumstances in which our assumptions fit the stylized
facts.  While to keep faith with Calabresi and Melamed we highlight nuisance examples, we believe
that contractual disputes provide an even larger class where our analysis is relevant.  Contractual
entitlements are also traditionally protected by liability rules (expectation damages); the decision to
breach (i.e. to take the promisee's entitlement) is often intentional; and contractual disputes are often
unavoidably bilateral.33  For example, once Epstein agrees to cut Rose’s hair, Rose is the only one
with whom Epstein can bargain if he wants to buy back his promise.34  While our article does not
provide a view of the entire legal "cathedral," the problem of how imperfectly informed courts
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should resolve bilateral disputes with intentional taking is much more than a theoretical curioso.
The article is divided into four parts.  Parts I and II analyze single- and dual-chooser rules,
respectively.  These parts derive the optimal damages for the four basic classes and analyze the
conditions under which a particular allocative equilibrium is most likely to be efficient.  Part III then
relates the dual-chooser rule to the higher-order rules previously analyzed by Ayres and Balkin.35
Finally, Part IV investigates how the preceding results are affected when we relax the most restrictive
assumptions of the model.  The conclusion shows how our analysis could be applied to improve
contract law and also how our analysis illuminates the issue of when liability rules should be used
instead of property rules.
I.  SINGLE-CHOOSER RULES
The original pair of liability rules analyzed by Calabresi and Melamed provide examples of
the two foundational single-chooser rules.  Rule 2 represents a defendant-choice rule because the
defendant (polluter) chooses who the ultimate entitlement holder will be by deciding whether or not
to pay to pollute.  And Rule 4 represents a plaintiff-choice rule because the plaintiff (resident)
chooses who the ultimate entitlement holder will be by deciding whether or not to pay to stop the
pollution.
The option recharacterization not only allows us to see the possibility of two more rules, but
also clarifies that liability rules (including “put option” rules) are not merely different ways of
protecting an entitlement.  They can also be thought of as different ways of dividing the parties’
claims to the entitlement.  As Carol Rose has written,
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36Rose, supra note 9, at 2178-79.  See generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1062-65
(discussing dimensions into which an entitlement might be divided, including put and call divisions).
37Hohfeld long ago recognized that rights are relational.  See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Welsey
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913).  One’s right (or asset) can be seen as an obligation (or liability) on someone
else’s part.  The puts and call options in any row of Table 3 sum to zero, reflecting this Hohfeldian
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[under a property rule regime], the entitlement holder has the whole meatball, so to
speak, and the other party has nothing—one has property, the other has zip.  Under
either of the two [call option] liability rules, on the other hand, the meatball gets split:
The factory has an option to pollute (or once exercised, an easement), while the
homeowner has a property right subject to an option (or easement).  For the sake of
simplicity, I will refer to this kind of right as a PRSTO (or PRSTE) for “property
right subject to an option (or easement).”36
Under this view, options merely divide the claims to an entitlement in a different way than, say, a
physical or temporal partition.
Table 3: Possible “Derivative” Divisions of an Entitlement
How Different Rules Divide Parties’ Claims to an Asset
Resident’s Claim Polluter’s Claim
Rule 1 Asset 0
Rule 2 Asset - Call Call
Rule 3 0 Asset
Rule 4 Call Asset - Call
Rule 5 - Put Asset + Put
Rule 6 Asset + Put - Put
Table 3 shows how each of the six rules represents a different way in which the finite claims
to an entitlement might be divided.  Each of the rules maintains conservation of “matter,”37 in that
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38Seeing liability rules as “derivative” divisions that partition the claims to an entitlement into
two parts makes explicit the idea that changing the types of “protection” actually changes the content
of the entitlement.  See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335, 1338-39 (1986).  Seeing liability rules as merely asset divisions also calls into
question Richard Epstein’s claim for the dominance of ‘property rules.’  Because both the PRSTO
and the call option are themselves protected by property rules, see Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at
707, Epstein’s claim must not be just a claim about how entitlements should be protected but a claim
about what collection of strongly protected claims must be bundled together.
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the sum of the Polluter’s and Resident’s assets and liabilities under each rule nets out to “Asset.”
As Rose noted, a property rule (such as Rule 1 or 3) gives one party everything and the other person
“zip.”  But other divisions are possible.  Rose saw that having a “PRSTO” is the same as owning the
asset subject to a liability (depicted by the “- Call”) in that one might be forced to sell against one’s
will (for a price less than the actual value to one’s self).38  In contrast, the “put option” rules (Rules
5 and 6) give the initial entitlement holder everything that she would have under a property rule plus
a put option.  This necessarily implies that the non-entitlement holder has a liability (denoted by “-
Put”)—i.e., she might be forced to purchase against her will (for a price that is more than her true
value).
From the perspective of allocative efficiency, the four liability rules collapse into a choice
between just two potential allocations.  For any given damage amount and for any given litigant
valuations, Rule 2 will allocate the entitlement to the same litigant as Rule 5, and Rule 4 will allocate
the entitlement to the same litigant as Rule 6.
To see this, consider an entitlement dispute between two litigants -- a plaintiff and a
defendant.  Let vΠ be the plaintiff’s valuation, and let v∆ be the defendant’s.  We assume that each
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40How to arrive such as this will be shown in the Appendix, infra at 111.
41If v∆ = D, the defendant is indifferent as to whether it exercises either its put or its call
options.  But regardless of how the defendant treats such ties, the expected total payoffs of the
litigants is unaffected.  The inequalities in the text implicitly assume that the defendant’s willingness
to pay equals its willingness to accept.  See Ayres, supra note 9, and infra at 90 for discussion of why
this assumption might not hold.
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litigant knows her own valuation but—like the court—only knows the probability distribution of her
adversary’s value. We will refer to the probability density function of the plaintiff and defendant,
respectively, as fΠ(v) and f∆(v), and their means as µΠ and µ∆.  Although we will later relax the
following assumptions,39 we also begin by assuming  that the litigants' valuations are distributed
independently of one another and that the transaction costs (or enmity) are sufficiently high to
prevent the litigants from consensually resolving their dispute. 
If we let the court awarded damages equal D, then it is straightforward to see40 that under
Rule 2 the defendant will exercise its call option to force the plaintiff’s non-consensual sale (in
exchange for D damages) if and only if:
v∆ > D.
Similarly, under Rule 5, the defendant will exercise its put option to force the plaintiff’s non-
consensual purchase (at a price of D damages) if and only if:
v∆ < D.41
These inequalities indicate that under either of the defendant-choice rules, the defendant will allocate
the entitlement to itself when its value is greater than the damage amount and will allocate the
entitlement to the plaintiff when its value is less than the damage amount.  Thus, for defendant-
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42The payoffs of the individual litigant is merely equal to her valuation of the entitlement if
she ends up owning it, plus any side payments that she makes to or receives from the other litigants.
Since the side payments must sum to zero, the total payoff for the plaintiff and defendant simply
equals the value ascribed to the entitlement by the litigant who ultimately owns it.
43Note the parallel to the Coase Theorem.  In a world without transaction costs, the judicial
assignment of entitlements does not affect the allocative equilibrium but does affect the distribution
of payoffs.  It should not be surprising that an autarkic model (where high transaction costs make
bargaining prohibitive) of liability rules can produce a similar result.  Ayres and Balkin showed that
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choice rules, the ultimate allocation is independent of the plaintiff’s value.  And because the
defendant-choice rules produce identical allocations, they perforce must produce identical total
payoffs.42   This means that, given any particular values of D, vΠ, and  v∆, the defendant-choice rules
(Rule 2 and 5) produce equal allocative efficiency.
An analogous result obtains for plaintiff-choice rules—Rules 4 and 6.  When the plaintiff’s
value exceeds the damage amount, the plaintiff will choose to allocate the entitlement to itself; when
the plaintiff’s value is less than the damage amount, the plaintiff will allocate the entitlement to the
defendant.  And because the physical allocations are identical for any possible realization of litigants’
value, the allocative efficiency of Rules 4 and 6 are equal.
We can now see that the judicial choice of an initial entitlement holder is not a significant
determinant of allocative efficiency.  Rule 2 is allocatively equivalent to Rule 5, and Rule 4 is
allocatively equivalent to Rule 6—even though the two rules within each of these pairs give the
initial entitlement to different litigants.  Instead, allocative efficiency turns crucially on which litigant
gets to decide the ultimate allocation.
But the judicial choice of the initial entitlement holder does importantly affect how the total
payoff is distributed between the plaintiff and the defendant.43  Looking again at Table 3, it should
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liability rules formed a kind of auction mechanism which would mimic the results of Coasean
negotiations.  See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 727-29.
44For example, if the plaintiffs and defendants valuations are independently and uniformly
distributed between $0 and $100, and if damages are set equal to $50 (which we later show is the
optimal amount), then Rule 5 will yield an expected defendant payoff of $62.50, while Rule 2 will
yield the defendant only $12.50.  See Ayres, supra note 9, at 806.
45See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15 (deriving this result with regard to call option rules
2 and 4).
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be clear that defendants are better off with the defendant-choice rule, which gives them the
entitlement plus a put  (Rule 5), than with the defendant-choice rule, which gives them merely a call
(Rule 2).44
The foregoing suggests that judges in choosing among the four liability rules can separate
allocative and distributive concerns.  Selecting the chooser determines the allocative equilibrium,
while selecting the initial entitlement holder determines the distributive equilibrium.  To establish
a single-chooser regime, judges must (i) select the more allocatively efficient chooser, (ii) select a
damage amount, and (iii) select how the expected total payoff will be distributed (for example,
choose between Rules 2 and 5).  The remainder of this section is organized around these three tasks.
A.  Selecting Optimal Damages
While selecting the optimal chooser seems logically prior to selecting the optimal damages,
as is often the case in game-theory, it is more convenient to solve the model backwards -- deriving
first the optimal damage amount for a particular chooser and then comparing which chooser is the
more efficient.  The task of selecting optimal damages is conceptually straightforward.  The
allocative efficiency of single-chooser rules is maximized when damages are set equal to the non-
chooser’s expected value.45  This means that the (allocatively) optimal damage amount for the
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46If the distributions are correlated, then the optimal single chooser damages will still be set
at the non-choosers mean value -- but because the mean value is now a function of chooser's value
optimal damages will find the fixed point at which damages equal the non-chooser's value such that
the chooser's value also equal this amount.  See infra at 94.
47As discussed in the next section, infra at 36, the single-chooser rules give the non-chooser
a fixed expected payoff whether or not the chooser exercises her option.  For example, under Rule
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defendant-choice rules will be
D∆ = µΠ,
and for the plaintiff-choice rules will be
DΠ = µ∆.
These results are quite general—holding true regardless of the ways in which the valuations of
litigants are distributed (so long as the litigants' distributions are independent).46  While courts may
also have legitimate concerns about equity and other aspects of efficiency (such as inducing adequate
ex ante incentives to create the entitlement in question), courts’ separate ability to establish almost
any desired distributive equilibrium strongly counsels in favor of the courts choosing damages that
will maximize the size of the pie to be divided.
Setting damages equal to the non-chooser’s expected valuation maximizes the allocative
efficiency of a single-chooser rule because it gives the chooser the incentive to allocate the
entitlement to herself only when her value is higher than the mean value of the non-chooser (and the
incentive to allocate the entitlement to the non-chooser only when the chooser’s value is lower than
the mean value of the non-chooser).  Setting damages at the non-chooser’s mean value thus
harnesses the private information of the chooser (who is reasonably assumed to know her own value)
and induces a choice of ultimate asset allocation that is, on average, correct.47  For example, if the
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2, the plaintiff as non-chooser receives an expected value equal to her mean valuation if the
defendant does not exercise its call option (because the plaintiff will retain the entitlement) and it
will receive its expected value in cash if the defendant does exercise its call option (and pays
damages set equal to the expected value).  Fixing the expected payoff of the non-chooser makes the
chooser the residual claimant of gains from exercising its choice.  The non-chooser is like the
bondholder in corporate law who is a fixed claimant on the assets of the firm, while the chooser is
like the shareholders who is granted the residual claim.  Because the chooser internalizes all the
marginal effects of her choice, single-chooser rules give the chooser (like the shareholder) an
incentive to choose the allocation which—conditional on her knowledge (which is assumed to be
superior to that of the judge)—maximizes allocative efficiency.
48The defendant under Rule 2 will choose to pollute and pay $50, only if its valuation exceeds
the plaintiff's mean value; and the defendant under Rule 5 will forego receiving $50, only if its
valuation exceeds $50.
49See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7 (suggesting that more efficient chooser is the side of the
litigation that is less numerous).
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plaintiff's mean valuation is $50, then setting damages for either Rule 2 or Rule 5 equal to this
amount will induce the defendant only to allocate the entitlement to itself when such an allocation
is on average efficient.48  Even when the judge does not know as much as the individual litigants,
liability rules allow the judge to exploit the private information of one of the litigants.
B.  Selecting the Chooser
The second judicial task that affects allocative efficiency is to choose the chooser.  For while
the put and call implementations of a given single-chooser rule produce identical allocations, there
is no guarantee that a plaintiff-chooser rule will produce the same allocation as a defendant-chooser
rule.  In this section, we provide some guidance to courts determining which party is the more
efficient chooser -- i.e., which chooser will produce the highest total expected payoff..49
The first step to identifying the more efficient chooser is to express the total (that is,
combined plaintiff and defendant) expected payoff for a given single chooser rule.  These profits can
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be expressed analytically as follows:
E Total Payoff q f q dqnc c nc c c c
nc




where the subscripts c and nc refer to the chooser and non-chooser, respectively.  We derive the
foregoing expression in the appendix, but, for now, it can be expressed in more stylized terms as:
Expected Total Payoff = non-chooser’s mean + chooser’s call. (A)
Intuitively, the chooser has the choice of allocating the entitlement to the non-chooser (in which case
the total payoff will equal the non-chooser’s mean) or exercising its option of allocating the
entitlement to itself (in which case the total payoff will equal the non-chooser's mean plus the
expected amount by which chooser's mean exceeds the non-chooser's mean).  This option (which we
label “chooser’s call”) of allocating the entitlement to itself when the chooser’s privately known
value exceeds the non-chooser’s mean is the reason that liability rules systematically dominate
property rules in the absence of bargaining.  
But it turns out that the expected total payoff can be alternatively expressed as:
Expected Total Payoff = chooser’s mean + chooser’s put. (B)
We can also think of the single-chooser rule as allowing the chooser to keep the entitlement (yielding
an allocation the value of which, on average, equals the chooser’s mean) or to put the entitlement
to the non-chooser when the chooser’s privately known value is less than the non-chooser’s mean.
Finance cognoscenti will recognize the equivalence of these two payoff expressions as an implication
of the “put-call parity formula”—which teaches that whenever a value can be expressed in terms of
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50See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 557
(5th ed. 1996) (defining put-call parity); Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1047 (applying put-call
parity to liability rules).  The put-call parity formula is often stated in the following form:
Call + Exercise Price = Put + Underlying Asset.
As applied to single-chooser rules, since the exercise price of the options is set equal to the non-
chooser’s mean value, the left-hand side of this equation equals the first expression (equation A) for
the expected total payoff.  And since the expected value of the underlying asset to the chooser is its
mean, the right-hand side of this equation equals the second expression (equation B) for the expected
total payoff.
51Analogously, “putΠ(µ∆)” represents the expected value of a put option for a defendant when
the exercise price of the put is set at the plaintiff’s mean valuation
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an implicit call, there must be an equivalent way of expressing the same value in terms of an implicit
put.50
These two expressions for the expected total payoff when applied to both plaintiff- and
defendant-choice rules give rise to 4 equivalent comparisons for determining which litigant is the
better chooser.  Plaintiff-choice rules (either Rule 4 or 6) will be more efficient than defendant-
choice rules (either Rules 2 or 5) if and only if the following equivalent conditions hold:
(i)  callΠ(µ∆) > put∆(µΠ),
(ii)  putΠ(µ∆) > call∆(µΠ),
(iii)  µΠ -µ∆ > put∆(µΠ) - putΠ(µ∆), and
(iv)  callΠ(µ∆) - call∆(µΠ) > µΠ - µ∆,
where, for example, “callΠ(µ∆)” represents the expected value of a call option for a plaintiff when
the exercise price of the call (reported in the parentheses) is set at the defendant’s mean valuation.51
Two points are immediately worth emphasizing.  First, these four inequalities merely restate one
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52It should be stressed that we are using the word "speculative" in a special sense.  Our model
assumes that each litigant places a non-speculative, certain dollar value on its ownership of the
entitlement while the court and the adversaries must speculate (via a probability distribution) about
how much the entitlement is valued by the litigant.  But in many real-world contexts, the litigants
themselves may not know their precise valuations.  A polluter, for example, may also have to
speculate about how profitable a polluting factory would be in the future.  We will later relax the
assumption that litigants are perfectly informed about their own valuation, see infra at 82, but for
now it is sufficient to say that our core qualitative results go through.  The more efficient chooser
will continue to be the litigant with the larger informational advantage.
53See infra at 111.
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another so that probability distributions which satisfy one of the inequalities must automatically
satisfy the others.  Second, the exercise price of the options are always set at the mean valuation of
non-option holder (i.e. the non-chooser).  This latter point is just an implication of the last section’s
finding that optimal damages should be set at the non-chooser’s mean value.
The most important implication of these comparisons—which is particularly evident in the
first two inequalities—is that the litigant with the more speculative52 valuation will tend to be the
more efficient chooser.  This again will not surprise finance cognoscenti.  A central result of
derivative theory is that options tend to be more valuable as the value of the underlying asset
becomes more volatile.  The litigant which the court perceives to have the more speculative value
is the litigant with the greater informational advantage.
Indeed, we show in the Appendix that when the court is choosing between a litigant whose
value is commonly known and another litigant whose value is only commonly known to fall within
a particular probability distribution, the litigant with the known value is never the efficient chooser.53
This makes intuitive sense.  The litigant whose non-random value is commonly known has no
private information to bring to the allocative table.  Given the allocative choice, such a litigant would
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always allocate the entitlement to herself (i.e., her value were higher than the other litigant’s mean)
or always allocate the entitlement to her adversary (i.e., her value were lower than the other litigant’s
mean).  A court selecting a litigant with a non-random value and setting the damage amount would
effectively be choosing the ultimate entitlement holder.  If the actual value placed on the entitlement
by the other litigant were different than expected, the entitlement could end up in the wrong hands.
In contrast, if the court selected the litigant with the random valuation as the chooser (and set
damages equal to the non-random value of the other litigant), first-best allocative efficiency would
always be achieved.  The random litigant would only allocate the entitlement to herself when she
knew that her value was higher than that of the non-random litigant, and she would only allocate the
entitlement to the other when her value was lower.
Inspecting the latter two inequalities—(iii) and (iv)—one might at first think that the relative
means of the litigants were also relevant in selecting the more efficient chooser.  But this turns out
not to be true.  First, as an algebraic matter, notice that in the third inequality the plaintiff having a
higher mean relative to the defendant seems to increase the likelihood that the plaintiff is the efficient
chooser, while in the fourth inequality the plaintiff having a higher mean seems to decrease the
likelihood that the plaintiff is the more efficient chooser.  Both cannot be true because, as we prove
in the Appendix,54 these inequalities are mathematically equivalent.  As it turns out, neither intuition
is true because the values of the puts and the calls also change in ways that offset the direct impact
of the change in litigants’ mean values.  For example, if the plaintiff’s mean becomes higher relative
to the defendant’s mean (holding the variance of both litigants’ values constant), both the plaintiff’s
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55From a court's perspective, a plaintiff whose mean value is higher than the defendant's mean
value is more likely to exercise its call (because more of the probability weight in plaintiff’s
distribution will exceed the call’s exercise price, which is set at the defendant’s mean); and the
defendant is more likely to exercise its put (because more of the probability weight in the defendant’s
distribution will fall below the put’s exercise price, which is set at the plaintiff’s mean).
56These effects are at play with inequalities (iii) and (iv) as well.  An increase in the plaintiff
mean relative to the defendant mean increases both sides of inequalities (iii) and (iv).  With regard
to (iii), for example, it is easy to directly see that the left-hand side (µΠ - µ∆) increases, but the right-
hand side also increases as the shift in mean causes “put∆(µΠ)” to increase and “putΠ(µ∆)” to
decreases.
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call and the defendant’s put should become more valuable.  This shift in means drives both these
options further “in the money.”55
As a general matter, option value is a function of both a “volatility” effect and an “in the
money” effect—meaning that options are generally more valuable (a) the more volatile the option
holder’s value and (b) the further the option holder’s expected value exceeds (for call ) or falls short
of (for puts) the exercise price.  But in working through the four inequalities, one can see that the “in
the money” effect on option value equally affects both sides of each inequality.  An increase in the
plaintiff’s mean relative to the defendant’s mean, increases both sides of inequality (i) and decreases
both sides of inequality (ii).  In inequality (i), for example, the “in the money” effect on the
plaintiff’s call is exactly the same as for defendant’s put.56  Consequently, a shift in means should
not—holding volatility constant—push a court toward either favoring or disfavoring a particular
litigant as the more efficient chooser.
Courts in selecting the more efficient chooser should focus on the second moment of the
distribution (the variance), not the first moment (the mean)—and select the litigant who from the
court’s perspective has a higher variance of value.  This finding suggests that the Restatement
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(Second) of Torts is misguided in suggesting that courts should assign the initial entitlement in
nuisance disputes to the party which it perceives to have the higher value.  This allocation principle
makes eminent sense if the court were merely choosing between the two possible property rules
(Rule 1 and 3).  But the principle fails to maximize allocative efficiency when the court is
contemplating a choice between the call option versions of the liability rules (Rules 2 and 4).
Although we demonstrated above that selecting the initial entitlement holder need not affect the
ultimate allocation, this is only true in a world in which put-option as well as call-option liability
rules are employed—so that the choice of the initial entitlement holder can be decoupled from the
choice of the more efficient chooser.  But the world contemplated by the Restatement does not
decouple these two choices.  In the Restatement’s world (where the only liability rules that judges
award are the call option versions—Rules 2 and 4), a rule that the litigant with the higher perceived
value should be the initial entitlement holder is tantamount to a rule that the litigant with the lower
perceived value should be the chooser—via the call-option Rule 2 or 4.  Our model does not support
the Restatement’s position.  Rather, we propose that when there are two litigants, the more efficient
chooser will tend to be the chooser who from the court’s perspective has the greater variance of
potential private valuations. 
From a pragmatic perspective, our two allocative rules work together to allow the court to
avoid calculating speculative damages.  We have suggested that courts should select as chooser the
litigant with the more speculative value and then set damages equal to the less speculative mean of
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57We agree with Kaplow and Shavell that the speculative nature of damages is not a reason
for excluding them from the court’s assessment, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 728-32,
but our approach simplifies the judicial task by only requiring the court to make an assessment of
how much the less speculative litigant on average values the entitlement.
58See Ayres, supra note 9, at 812-13, 821 & n.81.  For example, if the litigants’ values are
both uniformly distributed between $0 and $100, then a single-chooser rule will give the chooser a
fixed amount 50% of the time, and a $50 range of values the other 50% of the time, but the rule will
give the non-chooser a fixed payoff 50% of the time and a $100 dollar range of values the other 50%
of the time.  We derive this more formally in the Appendix, infra, at 111.
59See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 471-72.
60See infra at 87.
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the non-chooser.57
In a less reductive model, the court’s selection of the more efficient chooser will turn on more
than just an assessment of relative volatility of the litigants’ values.  For example, considerations of
the litigants’ relative risk aversion might affect a court’s choice.  The variance of the choosers’
expected payoffs will tend to be lower than the non-choosers’ because choosers have greater control
over their destiny.58  Thus, besides selecting the chooser with the more speculative damages,
efficiency-minded courts, other things held equal, might also favor selecting as chooser the more risk
averse litigant.  
At other times, the more efficient chooser will be the litigant that is less numerous.59  If a
single source of pollution harms multiple residents it may be difficult to implement a plaintiff choice
rule for the plaintiff class.  We will return to this issue infra when we include a more extended
discussion of how numerosity affects our analysis.60
C.  Selecting the Distribution
The first two judicial tasks—selecting the chooser and selecting the damages—are sufficient
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61In analyzing the distributive consequences of different rules, it is important to distinguish
between two different informational perspectives.  The ex ante perspective assesses the litigants'
expected payoffs before they acquire information about their own valuation of the entitlement.  The
interim perspective assesses the litigants' expected payoffs after they learn their own valuations of
the entitlement but before learning the other side's valuation.  From the ex ante perspective, the
possibility of being subject to the other side's put option does not produce a negative expected
payoff.  Under Rule 6, a Polluter may be forced to purchase the right to pollute, but if the price is set
at the Polluter's expected valuation, the Polluter's expected payoff is zero.  In contrast, from the
interim perspective, the possibility of being subject to the other side's put option can produce a
negative expected payoff -- if for example under Rule 6 you are a Polluter who happens to have a
lower than average valuation.  The ex ante perspective is also the perspective of the court -- in
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to determine the allocative equilibrium -- that is, who will end up with ultimate entitlement for
particular realizations of the litigants’ value.  For example, we may have determined that a defendant
choice rule is efficient, but we would still need to select between Rules 2 and 5 in deciding how the
pie should be divided between the litigants. In this section, we show that a court has an unfettered
control to divide the expected total payoff as it likes between the two litigants—without affecting
the allocative efficiency.  In other words, the court can decouple questions of distribution from
questions of allocation 
It is intuitively obvious that a chooser who is granted the entitlement plus a put option will
have a higher payoff than a chooser who merely has a call option to buy the entitlement for a price.
Accordingly, the put implementations of the single-chooser rules yield a relatively larger payoff for
the chooser (and a relatively smaller payoff for the non-chooser) than the call implementations of
the single-chooser rules.
But we can go further in describing the relative payoffs of the litigants.  The single-chooser
rules have the interesting feature that the non-chooser’s expected payoff does not depend on whether
the chooser allocates the entitlement to itself or the non-chooser.61  The non-chooser’s expected
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deciding how to divide the expected payoffs between sets of observationally equivalent litigants.
This perspective may at times also be relevant in creating efficient investment incentives -- if the
parties don't know their actualized valuation until after an entitlement has been created.  But in other
contexts the interim perspective will drive potentially both investment and allocation decisions.  
62If a chooser exercises her call option, the non-chooser receives µNC with certainty.  If a
chooser does not exercise her call option, the non-chooser simply retains the entitlement which she
values on average at µNC.
Of course, once non-choosers come to know their private value of the entitlement, they will
not be indifferent about whether the chooser exercises her option or not.  But the court (and other
policy makers) will never be privy to this privately held information, so the best that a distributively-
concerned court can do is to adopt the type of implementation that tends, on average, to produce a
preferred distribution.
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payoff is invariant with respect to the chooser’s actual choice.  More particularly,
(1) in put implementations of the single-chooser rules, the non-chooser’s expected payoff
is fixed at $0—whether or not the chooser exercises her put option; and,
(2) in call implementations of the single-chooser rules, the non-chooser’s expected
payoff is fixed at her mean value (µNC)—whether or not the chooser exercises her call
option.
First, consider a put implementation (i.e., where the chooser has both the entitlement and a put
option).  If the chooser does not exercise the put, the non-chooser’s payoff is zero with certainty
because she neither receives the entitlement nor makes a payment.  Alternatively, if the chooser
exercises the put, the non-chooser’s expected payoff is zero because she must pay µNC for something
that she values on average at µNC.  Similar reasoning shows that call implementations fix the non-
chooser’s expected payoff at µNC.62
Thus, call implementations give the non-chooser an expected payoff that is µNC higher than
put implementations of single-chooser rules.  And since we know that put and call implementations
of the single-chooser rules produce the same expected total payoff (equal to µNC + callC), it must be
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making the defendant the chooser, could give the plaintiff an expected payoff of zero (through a
defendant put implementation—Rule 5) or µΠ (through a defendant call implementation—Rule 4).
But if the court felt that the plaintiff deserved an expected payoff between zero and µΠ, it might
decide to make the plaintiff the chooser via a call implementation—so that the plaintiff’s expected
payoff would fall in this intermediate level (0 < callΠ < µΠ).
64Other authors have suggested a proliferation of liability rules on different grounds, see, e.g.,
Levmore, supra note 7, at 2171 (showing how liability rules could require different levels of




(1) that chooser’s expected payoff in put implementations equals the total expected
payoff (µNC + callC); and
(2) that chooser’s expected payoff in call implementations equals the value of a
chooser’s call (callC).
The varying distributions of the put and the call implementations give policymakers more flexibility
in pursuing non-allocative goals, but, if there were only two implementations, we would still be left
with a rather crudely hewn distributive instrument.  And distributively-minded lawmakers might at
times want to tradeoff ex post allocative efficiency, in favor of more preferred distribution, by
selecting an inefficient chooser in order to produce an expected payoff between what would be
possible if either the call or put implementations of the efficient single-chooser rule were selected.63
Fortunately, it is possible to radically expand the class of single-chooser rules by, in a sense,
“convexifying” the payoffs between the call and the put implementations.  We refer to this as our
convexity result.  It turns out that the two single-chooser allocations can be implemented not just by
four rules but by a double continuum of rules which give policymakers the option of smoothly
distributing the expected joint surplus between the litigants as they see fit.64 
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The key here is to distinguish between the damages that a chooser must pay if it allocates the
entitlement to itself (which we will call DC) from the damages that a chooser must pay if it allocates
the entitlement to the non-choosing litigant (which we will call DNC).  As shown in Table 4, a call
implementation of a single-chooser rule sets DC equal to the non-chooser’s mean (µNC) and sets DNC
equal to zero, which means that the chooser must pay to nonconsensually take the entitlement, but
pays nothing if she leaves the entitlement in the hands of the non-chooser.  In contrast, a put
implementation sets DC = 0 and sets DNC = - µNC,  which means that the chooser pays nothing to
retain the entitlement, and receives the non-chooser’s mean (pays negative µNC) if she puts the
entitlement to the non-chooser.
Table 4: Expanding the Class of Single-chooser Implementations
Implementation
Damages Expected Payoff
DC DNC Chooser Non-Chooser
Call µNC 0 callC µNC
Put 0 -µNC callC + µNC 0
“Pay or Be Paid” µNC/2 -µNC/2 callC + (µNC/2) µNC/2
“Pay or Pay” µNC + callC callC 0 callC +µNC
Alpha
(for all 0 # α #1) α (µNC + callC) α (µNC + callC) - µNC (1-α) (µNC + callC) α (µNC + callC)
We normally think of an option as requiring a monetary payment only if the option holder exercises
the option.  But when the puts and calls are described in terms of the amounts paid by the option
holder contingent on either choice, it is possible to see a range of new single-chooser rules that
induce the chooser to make identical allocations.
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65Opportunity cost is “the price that you pay for things that you might have done.”  Ian Ayres,
Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups:  Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 688 n.19 (1990) (quoting Billy Joel, Only the Good Die Young (1977)).
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For example, as shown in Table 4, by merely averaging the damages in the put and the call
implementations we can create a new rule—which requires the chooser to pay (to the non-chooser)
half the non-chooser’s mean value if it allocates the entitlement to itself, but entitles the chooser to
a payment (from the non-chooser) of half the non-chooser’s mean value if it allocates the entitlement
to the non-chooser.  We refer to this implementation as a “Pay or be Paid” rule.  This rule induces
identical allocations as the put and the call rules.  For example, instead of asking the plaintiff (under
Spur-like application of Rule 4) whether she is willing to pay $1 million to enjoin defendant's
pollution, a "Pay or be Paid" rule might ask the plaintiff to elect whether she prefers to pay half a
million dollars to stop pollution or receive half a million dollars from defendant to put up with
continued pollution.  In either case, the chooser will only allocate the entitlement to herself if its
private value is greater than the non-chooser’s mean value, because self-allocation requires the
chooser to incur a direct cost of half the non-chooser’s mean value and an opportunity cost of half
the non-chooser’s value.65  Indeed, any implementation with damages such that:
DC - DNC = µNC
will produce an identical allocation.
It is possible to create allocations that produce even more lopsided distributions than either
the put or the call implementations without undermining the chooser’s incentive to make the efficient
choice (i.e., reveal her private information).  For example, Table 4 shows that by setting DC equal
to µNC + callC and setting DNC equal to callC, a court could grant the chooser a zero expected
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66To verify this result, just consider the non-chooser’s expected payoff.  If the chooser
allocates the entitlement to itself, the non-chooser receives (µNC+callC) with certainty; and if the
chooser allocates the entitlement to the non-chooser, the non-chooser receives callC plus retains the
entitlement which on average it values at µNC.
67See infra at 82.
68Even more lopsided distributions are possible, if the court shifted the DC and DNC damages
amount up above the "Pay or Pay" or down below the Put amounts. 
69See Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1062-65, & Rose, supra note 9, at 2178-79.
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payoff—thus giving the entire expected total payoff to the non-chooser.66  We call this a “Pay or
Pay” rule, because the chooser must pay the non-chooser regardless of whether she allocates the
entitlement to herself or to the non-chooser—allocating to the non-chooser merely reduces the
amount which the chooser needs to pay.  For example, instead of asking a defendant (under Rule 2)
whether it is willing to pay $1 million for the right to pollute, a "Pay or Pay" rule might ask the
polluter to elect between paying $1.2 million for the right to pollute and paying $.2 million if it
decides to forego polluting.  As with the foregoing "Pay or be Paid" rule, the chooser (absent wealth
and framing effects)67 will under either rule only allocate the entitlement to itself if its private value
is greater than the non-chooser's mean value.
The Put and the "Pay or Pay" implementations are of particular interest because they
represent alternatives that would allow judges to retain the allocative efficiency of a single-chooser
rule and still allocate all of the expected value to one litigant.  The put implementation gives all of
the total expected payoff to the chooser, while the "Pay or Pay" gives all of the total expected payoff
to the non-chooser.68  In the absence of bargaining, the property rules (Rules 1 and 3) also allocate
all of the payoffs to one litigant or the other,69 but the distributionally extreme liability rules (the Put
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and “Pay or Pay” implementations) systematically dominate their property rule counterparts because
they produce larger expected total payoffs.
By creating convex combinations of these damages under two rules, we can allow a court to
adopt any intermediate division of the expected total payoff.  As shown in Table 4 (in the row
labeled “Alpha”), by setting
DC = α (µNC + callC), and
DNC = α (µNC + callC) - µNC,
the court effectively distributes a fraction α of the expected total payoff to the non-chooser (and the
remaining fraction (1 - α) to the chooser).  Thus, by choosing the number α between zero and one,
this “alpha” implementation gives the court unfettered flexibility in dividing the pie between the
litigants without undermining the chooser’s incentives to maximize the pie’s size.   For example, by
setting α equal to 0.9, the court could can effectively distribute 90% of the expected total payoff to
the non-chooser (and only 10% to the chooser) without affecting the chooser’s incentive to allocate
the entitlement to the litigant with the higher valuation.  This alpha class includes both Pay-or-be-
Paid rules (when α takes on low values) as well as Pay-or-Pay rules (when α is sufficiently high).
It will have no doubt occurred to the reader that these new-fangled (Pay-or-be-Paid and Pay-
or-Pay) distributive rules are identical to rules in which the court simply implements a traditional call
option rule—but in addition requires a lump sum payment between the litigants regardless of what
allocation the chooser made.  Under this alternative, the court would set two prices -- an allocative
price (say, DA) which would determine the amount the chooser would pay if it allocated the
entitlement to itself and a distributive price (say, DD) which would determine the amount the chooser
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70Law and economic scholars have analyzed reasons decoupling the amount the defendant
pays from the amount that the plaintiff receives.  See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che,
Decoupling liability: optimal incentives for care and litigation, 22 RAND J Econ 562 (1991).  But
this type of decoupling analyzed in this article is different because the side payments of the litigants
always net to zero.
71Rule 6, for example, is a put option rule which gives the plaintiff both the initial entitlement
and the option to put the entitlement to the defendant at a price equal to defendant's mean valuation.
But the same allocation and distribution could be implemented by a Spur-like Rule 4 (which gives
the initial entitlement to the defendant but gives the plaintiff a call option to buy at the defendant's
mean valuation) if in addition the court also ordered the defendant to pay her mean valuation to the
plaintiff regardless of the plaintiff's choice (DD = - µNC).  Under the call implementation with the
lump-sum mean side payment, the plaintiff would end up with (i) the entitlement and no net dollar
transfer if she allocates the entitlement to herself and (ii) a net dollar transfer equaling the defendant's
mean value, if she allocates the entitlement to the defendant.  This is, of course, the same outcome
as under the put implementation.
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would pay (or be paid if DD was negative) regardless of the allocative choice.  While these alternative
implementations are mathematically equivalent, we conjecture that netting the allocative and
distribute prices together into for example a "Pay or be Paid" rule will be less jarring to judges then
carving out and naming an explicitly separate distributive lump sum amount.70  Indeed, even readers
who caught on to this lump sum alternative may not have seen that the put option rules that we
discussed in the introduction are mathematically nothing more than call option rules in which DD is
set equal to - µNC.71  The very novelty of the put-option implementations suggest that the foregoing
distributive analysis has not always been obvious to legal scholars. Indeed, one of the payoffs of this
article is to show that put option rules are not esoterica but merely implementations of call option
rules with a lump sum side payment.
In the past, courts may have been tempted to accommodate distributive considerations by
raising the simple exercise price of the traditional call.  This might be accomplished, for example,
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72At some point, however, an additional increase in the exercise price of the defendant’s call
would not increase the plaintiff’s expected payoff.
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by requiring Atlantic Cement to pay more than the residents’ expected value (as a condition for
acquiring a pollution right) if for some reason the court felt that the residents deserved a higher
expected payoff.72  But the foregoing analysis shows that such an award would needlessly sacrifice
allocative efficiency (by inducing Atlantic Cement to take too infrequently) on the alter of equity.
In this example, a better way to increase the residents’ payoff would be to institute a Pay-or-Pay
rule—which would simultaneously increase the amount that Atlantic Cement would pay even if it
chose not to pollute (DNC) and increase the price it must pay if it chose to pollute (DC).  More
generally, we have shown that it is misguided for courts to deviate from setting damages at the non-
chooser’s mean valuation as a way to improve distributive equity.
None of these implementations—including the infinity of alpha implementations— affect
the variance of expected payoff for either the chooser or the non-chooser.  Accordingly, a court’s
decision to select a chooser on the basis of the litigants’ relative risk aversion would not be affected
by the adoption of any of the different distribution implementations within a particular class of
single-chooser rules.  A court’s selection of the more efficient chooser—whether it be motivated by
considerations of numerosity, variance or risk aversion—is independent of the court’s distributive
choice.
This convexity result allows lawmakers to decouple distributive concerns from concerns
about ex post allocative efficiency, and thus frees courts to divide the expected total payoff in order
to further either equity or to generate better ex ante investment incentives.  From an equity
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perspective, courts might, for example, fine tune the extent to which a plaintiff’s coming-to-a-
nuisance claim should be awarded a particular expected payoff.  And the option perspective makes
clear that the court has more than the mean value of the higher valuing party to distribute.  Single-
chooser rules produce an expected total payoff that systematically exceeds the expected value of
either party—and a court concerned as a matter of equity in how the expected total payoff is
distributed can now make a more explicit decision about which litigant has a stronger equitable claim
to this option value.
From an efficiency perspective, the way that the court divides the expected total payoff of
the single-chooser rules can have important effects on the parties’ ex ante investment incentives.
If lawmakers think that it is particularly important to give the Resident an incentive to invest in her
land, then giving the Resident the initial entitlement plus a put (thereby distributing all of the
expected total payoff to her) will give her a much stronger incentive to invest than merely giving her
a call.73  Thus, expanding the class of plaintiff-chooser and defendant-chooser rules not only allows
lawmakers to better accommodate competing equity and efficiency concerns, but can also help
lawmakers better accommodate competing efficiency concerns—that is, the concern with ex ante
investment efficiency and the concern with ex post allocative efficiency.
While we have shown in our simple model that the courts distributive choice need not affect
the chooser’s allocative decision making, there is a sense in which the distributive rules may affect
the non-chooser’s decision making.  In some litigation contexts, the non-chooser may take an initial
action that triggers the chooser’s subsequent (put or call) option.  For example, the next section will
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show that a common law put rule can be seen as a two-stage process whereby the defendant, by
intentionally taking in the first stage, signals its willingness to be subjected to the plaintiff’s
subsequent put option.  Such two-stage liability regimes are examples of what we call dual-chooser
rules because both litigants have an impact on the potential ultimate allocation.  The goal of the next
section is to analyze what damages maximize the allocative efficiency of such rules, and to assess
the conditions under which dual-chooser rules dominate (or are dominated by) single-chooser rules.
II.  DUAL-CHOOSER RULES
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two more foundational allocative equilibria that
judges might choose in resolving disputes.  We refer to the legal regimes that give rise to these
allocations as “dual chooser” rules as opposed to “single chooser” rules because both litigants have
a potential impact on how the entitlement is allocated.   As with the single-chooser rules, there turn
out to be two dual-chooser allocations.  In what we call the “defendant-joint-veto” allocation either
litigant can veto the allocation of the entitlement to the defendant.  If either the plaintiff or the
defendant prefers that the entitlement be allocated to the plaintiff (with the associated court-
determined side-payment), then the plaintiff receives the entitlement.  Because both litigants must
agree to a defendant allocation, but either litigant is sufficient to ensure a plaintiff allocation, the
defendant-joint-veto equilibrium disproportionately allocates the entitlement to the plaintiff.  This
pro-plaintiff allocation bias can be observed in Panel (c) of earlier Figure 1, where three out of four
quadrants are allocated to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff-joint-veto rule conversely allocates the entitlement to the defendant unless both
plaintiff and defendant choose to allocate the good to the plaintiff (along with the associated court-
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prices.  But from an option perspective there is only one relevant allocative price and that is the
difference between these amounts (DC - DNC).  As discussed above, the decoupling of allocative and
distributive concerns can alternatively be implemented by the court explicitly seting a single
allocative price (DA ) and a single distributive price (DD ).  See supra at 41.
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determined side-payment).  Because either litigant can veto a plaintiff allocation, this type of rule
disproportionately allocates the entitlement to the defendant (see Panel (d) of Figure 1).
All four of these basic allocations—the two single-chooser allocations and the two dual-
chooser allocations—are the product of what we label “single price” rules.  In all the rules that give
rise to these allocations, the court sets a single allocative price74 and the identity of the chooser or
choosers, and then the court sits back and lets the chooser(s) allocate the entitlement.
There are a number of different option interpretations that give rise to these dual-chooser
allocations.  Here we examine two rules that implement the defendant-joint-veto allocation, but
analogous rules that implement the plaintiff-joint-veto allocation can be created by transposing the
identity of the plaintiff and defendants in the division of assets and liabilities.  Consider the
following two divisions of entitlements:
(A) Π: E + put(D∆JV) - put(D∆JV) ∆: - put(D∆JV) + put(D∆JV)
(B) Π: call(D∆JV) - put(D∆JV) ∆: E - call(D∆JV) + put(D∆JV) .
In the first ("put-put") regime (A), the plaintiff is given the initial entitlement plus a put
option to sell the entitlement to the defendant (and receive a price of $D∆JV), but is subject to the
defendant’s put option, which gives the defendant the option of selling the entitlement back to
plaintiff also for $D∆JV.  This rules allows either litigant to veto the transfer of the entitlement to the
defendant.  The plaintiff can veto the transfer of the entitlement by refusing to exercise its initial put,
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75Another option scheme that would allow either party to veto a transfer of the entitlement
to the defendant could be implemented by:
Π:  E - call(D∆JV) + call(D∆JV) ∆: + call(D∆JV) - call(D∆JV).
In the text’s double put rule, the plaintiff in a sense can offer to sell the entitlement for $D∆JV by
initially putting, and the defendant can accept this offer by choosing not to put the entitlement back.
In contrast, this footnote’s double call rule allows the defendant to figuratively offer to buy the
entitlement by exercising its initial call option, and the plaintiff can accept this offer by choosing not
to call the entitlement back.
47
and even if this put is exercised the defendant can veto the transfer by putting the entitlement back
to the plaintiff.  The equilibrium choices (strategies) that this rule induces are easy to derive.  The
plaintiff will only put the entitlement if:
vΠ < D∆JV,
and the defendant will only put the entitlement back if:
v∆ < D∆JV.
Together this means (as illustrated in panel (c) of Figure 1) that in equilibrium, defendant will be
allocated the entitlement if and only if:
vΠ < D∆JV < v∆.75
Alternatively, under the second regime (B), the plaintiff is given a call option to buy the
entitlement (which is initially allocated to the defendant), but is simultaneously subject to
defendant’s put option to sell.  This rule allows either litigant to force a transfer of the entitlement
from the defendant to the plaintiff (in return for a payment of $D∆JV from plaintiff to defendant).  As
with regime (A), the defendant will retain the entitlement if and only if:
vΠ < D∆JV < v∆.
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76The option interpretation of these dual-chooser rules makes clear that they are constrained
versions of what one of us has previously referred to as “second-order rules,” see Ayres & Balkin,
supra note 9.  The dual-chooser rules constrain the exercise price of the first and second options to
be the same ($D).  Part III of this paper analyzes and compares the unconstrained analog to dual-
chooser rules.
77An encroacher may thus be forced to compensate the landowner not just for the temporary
(past) encroachment, but to purchase a "permenant" right to encroach on the land (even if the
encroacher would prefer to remove the encroachment).
78See Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (1895) (after finding that defendant’s brick wall
encroached 1 and 3/8th inches underneath the plaintiff’s property, the court granted plaintiff the
choice of damages for “permanent tresspass” or an injunction to remove the “offending ends of the
stones”).
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This assures that the allocations of these two rules will be identical for any possible private
valuations of the plaintiff and defendant.  But as with the single-chooser rules, these different
implementations of the defendant-joint-veto allocation produce very different distributions.  By
inspecting the initial entitlement division, it is apparent that the plaintiff’s expected payoff is higher
if it is initially allocated its entitlement (and is compensated for its transfer) than if the plaintiff is
not initially allocated the entitlement (and can only gain it by paying a court-determined amount).76
These dual-chooser rules at first blush seem esoteric and other worldly, but as intimated at
the end of the last section, several common law settings provide at least the potential for joint-
chooser allocations.  For example, if Laurel intentionally encroaches on Hardy’s land, Hardy
traditionally has (in addition to damages for the prior encroachment) the choice of ejectment (an
injunction forcing Laurel to remove the encroachment) or permanent damages (forcing Laurel to
permanently purchase77 the encroaching property at a court-determined amount).78  Instead of
beginning the analysis with Hardy’s allocative choice (of taking back the land or forcing a sale to
Laurel), it may be more useful—at least with regard to deliberate encroachment—to think of the law
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79Accordingly, a similar two-stage analysis might be applied to (i) the tenant’s choice to hold
over followed by the landlord’s choice to force an additional term lease, see JESSE DUKEMINIER &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 431 (3d. ed. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.4 cmt.
F (1977), or (ii) the intentional taking of chattel followed by the owner’s choice of trover (i.e.,
compensatory damages) or replevin (i.e., an injunction ordering chattel’s return).  See DUKEMINIER
& KRIER, supra, at 105. 
80In contrast, it is usually possible to implement single chooser rules in which the defendant
has the sole allocative choice.  For example, the defendant’s choice both to commence pollution and
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as implementing a dual-chooser rule.  The encroacher signals his willingness to buy at a court-
determined price by intentionally encroaching and the plaintiff indicates his willingness to sell at this
same price by electing damages instead of ejectment.  More generally, in property law, the temporary
taking (or impairment) of someone else’s right often has the effect of triggering a put option.79  When
a deliberate taking (with the prospect of paying compensatory damages) is followed by a plaintiff’s
choice between compensation and restoration of the entitlement, these dual choices of the litigants
implement a defendant-joint-veto allocation—in that the entitlement will only be allocated to the
defendant if the defendant’s private value is higher than the expected court-awarded damages and
if the plaintiff’s private value is less than expected court-awarded damages.
Indeed, under current law it may be difficult for courts to implement true plaintiff-choice
rules—i.e., single-chooser rules that do not effectively include an element of defendant choice.
Plaintiffs are traditionally given a put option only after a defendant temporally impairs their initial
entitlements.  An intentional taking by the defendant converts such single-chooser put options into
dual-chooser allocations.  Only if the defendant unintentionally takes (as in some encroachment
examples) or if the plaintiff comes to a pre-existing nuisance might we have a circumstance in which
a true plaintiff-choice allocation is produced.80  But our motivation for studying dual-chooser
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
to exercise its call option amount to a unitary decision to take the entitlement and pay damages. Of
course, plaintiffs often make deliberate choices about whether to produce the entitlement in the first
place -- so the plaintiff's initial investment decision may introduce elements of plaintiff choice into
what otherwise would be a defendant chooser rule.  
There may, however, also be some limits on the ability of courts to vary how the payoff is
distributed.  If polluting potentially exposes the polluter to a “Pay or Pay” allocation, then a polluter
who will ultimately choose not to allocate the entitlement to itself will prefer not to pollute in the
first place.  See Levmore, supra note 9, at 2168-70  (discussing impact of expected damages on
litigants’ initial incentive to pollute or bring suit).
81See infra Appendix at 111.  Solving an analogous implicit formula for D yields the optimal
damages for the plaintiff-joint-veto allocation:
fΠ(vΠ = D∆JV)E[DΠJV - v∆*DΠJV > v∆] =  f∆(v∆ = DΠJV)E[vΠ - DJΠV *vΠ > DΠJV].
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allocations is not based solely on their current common law existence—rather, we intend to show
that dual-chooser rules at times are more allocatively efficient than single-chooser rules and should
accordingly be added more consciously to policymakers’ toolkits.
A.  Selecting Optimal Damages
In the appendix, we show that the damages that maximize allocative efficiency of a
defendant-joint-veto allocation are those D∆JV such that:
fΠ(vΠ =D∆JV)E[v∆ - D∆JV*v∆ > D∆JV] =  f∆(v∆ = D∆JV)E[D∆JV - vΠ*D∆JV > vΠ],
remembering that vΠ and v∆ represent the plaintiff's and defendant's respective valuation,  fΠ(vΠ) and
f∆(v∆) represent the plaintiff's and defendant's respective probability distribution of these valuations
and E represents an expectations operator.81  While this optimization equation (what economists call
a “first-order condition”) initially seems forbidding, it has a straightforward intuition.  By setting
damages, the court is simultaneously determining two allocative margins:  the margin on which the
plaintiff will veto allocations of the entitlement to the defendant, and the margin on which the
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82With higher damage amounts, the plaintiff is less likely to veto a defendant allocation
because the plaintiff is willing to allocate the entitlement to the defendant so long as:
vΠ < D∆JV.
Higher damage amounts increase defendant’s likelihood of vetoing defendant allocations because
it makes it less likely that:
D∆JV < v∆.
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defendant will veto allocations of the entitlement to the defendant.  The court’s task is to find the
single damage amount that optimally trades-off these two veto effects.  The damage amount that
solves the foregoing equation accomplishes precisely this task.
A small increase in the size of D∆JV—say from D' to D''—has the simultaneous effect of (i)
decreasing the plaintiff’s willingness to veto defendant allocations, and (ii) increasing the
defendant’s willingness to veto defendant allocations.82  The marginal impact on allocative efficiency
of decreasing the plaintiff’s willingness to veto is given by the left-hand side of the optimization
equation.  It represents the changed likelihood that the plaintiff will veto {fΠ(D∆JV)} multiplied by
the expected  change in allocative efficiency affected by the veto change {E[v∆ - D∆JV*v∆ > D∆JV]}.
The right-hand side of the equation analogously represents the marginal impact on allocative
efficiency of increasing the defendant’s willingness to veto defendant allocations.  Solving the
equation for D∆JV therefore yields the damage amount that equates the marginal improvements from
decreasing the plaintiff’s veto (increasing the plaintiff’s willingness to allocate to the defendant) with
the marginal reduction in allocative efficiency from increasing the defendant’s veto (decreasing the
defendant’s willingness to allocate the entitlement to itself).
In practice, the optimal damage amount will often be a weighted average of the plaintiff’s
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83See Ayres, supra note 9, at 827 (discussing possibility of “joint veto” regime with damages
that “will approximately split the difference between the Resident’s and the Polluter’s mean
valuations”).
84Applying our earlier equation for determining optimal dual chooser damages, see supra at
50, to the particular uniform distributions in this example implies that optimal damages will solve
the following equation:
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and the defendant’s mean values.  This makes some intuitive sense. Remember that the litigants’
mean values are the optimal amounts when a single litigant can veto the allocation of the entitlement
-- so it should not be surprising that the optimal joint veto amount will be some value in between the
optimal damages of the two single-chooser rules.  And while it outstrips the quality of the evidence
(as well as judicial temperament and training) to ask judges to explicitly solve the foregoing equation
for an optimal D, the idea that optimal defendant-joint-veto damages will often be close to the
average of the litigants' mean valuations provides some pragmatic guidance in setting damages.83
However, it is possible to construct examples where the optimal dual-chooser damages do
not lie between the mean valuations of the litigants.  For example, if the court perceives that the
plaintiff’s valuation is uniformly distributed between $25 and $75, while the defendant’s is
uniformly distributed between $0 and $100, it can be shown that the optimal defendant-joint-veto
damages equal $62.50—which is higher than the litigants’ mean valuation of $50.84  The reason for
this result is that the plaintiff is a systematically poorer chooser than the defendant.  Because the
variation in the plaintiff’s valuation is smaller than in the defendant’s valuation, the defendant’s
informational advantage (vis-à-vis the court) is greater than the plaintiff’s.  This means—harkening
back to the last section—that a defendant single-chooser allocation would dominate a plaintiff
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single-chooser allocation.  But it also affects how a court will want to distribute the allocative power
between the litigants in tailoring a dual-chooser rule.  Increasing the damage amount (above both
parties’ means) when the plaintiff is a relatively poor chooser decreases the likelihood that the
plaintiff will exercise its allocative power by vetoing a defendant allocation. It turns out that it is
more efficient to cause the more efficient chooser (the defendant) to veto too many defendant
allocations because doing so tends to limit the veto power of the less efficient chooser (the plaintiff).
We will return to this example again when we compare the four basic allocative equilibria—because,
as we will see, the same thing that causes dual-chooser damages to take on extreme, and seemingly
counterintuitive, values also causes single-chooser rules to dominate dual-chooser rules.
B.  Selecting the Distribution
Before comparing the relative allocative efficiency of the different rules, we pause here to
reiterate that, as with the single-chooser rules, it is possible to proliferate the implementations of
dual-chooser rules in ways that leave allocative efficiency unaffected, but which vary the expected
relative payoffs of the individual litigants.  Just as we distinguished between the price that the
chooser would pay if she allocated the entitlement to herself (DC) and the price that the chooser
would pay if she allocated the entitlement to the nonchooser (DNC), it is possible with regard to
defendant-joint-veto allocation to distinguish between:
DNo Veto = the price the defendant pays the plaintiff if neither litigant vetoes the
allocation of the entitlement to the defendant; and,
DVeto = the price the defendant pays the plaintiff if one of the litigants vetoes so that
the entitlement is allocated to the plaintiff.
If we label the damage amount that solves the foregoing optimization equation as D∆JV, then a
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85For example, assume that D∆JV equals the optimal damages for the defendant-joint-veto
allocation, see supra 50, and that under the straightforward "put-put" regime (discussed supra at 46,
in which DNo Veto = D∆JV  and DVeto = 0) the expected payoffs of the plaintiff and the defendant are
respectively, EP∆ and EPΠ..  Then it can be shown that an implementation that sets DNoVeto = D∆JV -
EPΠ and DVeto = -EPΠ would distribute all of the joint expected payoff to the defendant; and an
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continuous variety of allocatively identical defendant-joint-veto rules can be created that take the
form:
DNo Veto - DVeto = D∆JV.
For example, if the allocatively optimal damages equal $50, then a dual-chooser rule that required
the defendant to pay $25 to the plaintiff when the entitlement is allocated to the defendant (DNo Veto
= $25), and required the plaintiff to pay $25 to the defendant when the entitlement is allocated to the
plaintiff (DVeto = -$25) would produce exactly the same allocative choices by the litigants as a simpler
rule that required a payment of $50 by the defendant if the parties jointly chose to allocate the
entitlement to the defendant.  In either case, the plaintiff would only choose to allocate the
entitlement to the defendant if the plaintiff’s value was less than $50, and the defendant would only
choose to allocate the entitlement to itself if its value was greater than $50. 
As before, a lock-step increase (or decrease) in DNo Veto and DVeto does not affect the litigants’
allocative choice and a fortiori the allocative efficiency, but instead has the effect of increasing (or
decreasing) the proportion of the expected total payoff that will go on average to the plaintiff.  Courts
are free to distribute the total expected payoff between the litigants as they see fit.  While
computationally more difficult, courts could create a dual chooser analog to the earlier "alpha" single
chooser rules which would allow them to give a fraction α of the expected joint payoffs to the
plaintiff and a fraction (1- α) to the defendant.85
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implementation that sets DNoVeto = D∆JV + EP∆ and DVeto = EP∆ would distribute all of the joint
expected payoff to the plaintiff.  More generally, an implementation that sets DNoVeto = D∆JV  - αEPΠ
+ (1-α)EP∆ and DVeto = - αEPΠ + (1-α)EP∆ would distribute a fraction α of the joint expected payoff
to the plaintiff and a fraction (1-α) to the defendant.
86Besides this “off diagonal” effect, the two types of dual-chooser rules can produce
marginally different optimal damages, see supra note 70 and accompanying text, which might affect








C.  Selecting the Choosers
An initial judicial task in selecting the allocatively efficient chooser is to determine which
of the two dual-chooser allocations is the more efficient—the defendant-joint-veto rule or the
plaintiff-joint-veto rule.  Graphically, this comes down to a determination of whether the off-
diagonal quadrants of Figure 2 are better allocated to the plaintiff or to the defendant.  Both
allocations generate identical allocations of the first quadrant (which is allocated to the defendant)
and the fourth quadrant (which is allocated to
the plaintiff), but a defendant-joint-veto regime
allocates the off-diagonal quadrants (II and III)
to the plaintiff, while a plaintiff-joint-veto
regime allocates the off-diagonal quadrants to
the defendant.86
It turns out that the defendant-joint-veto
equilibrium will tend to dominate the plaintiff-
joint-veto equilibrium when:
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87For example, it can be shown that when the litigants’ valuations are uniformly distributed,
that a higher plaintiff mean implies that defendant-joint-veto equilibrium will produce a higher
expected joint payoff than the plaintiff-joint-veto equilibrium.
88Applying our earlier equation for determining optimal dual chooser damages, see supra at
50, to the particular uniform distributions in this example implies that optimal damages will solve
the following equation:
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µΠ > µ∆.87
For example, imagine that the defendant’s valuation is uniformly distributed between $0 and $100,
and that the plaintiff’s valuation is uniformly distributed between $80 and $180.  It can be shown
that the optimal damages for either a defendant-joint-veto or a plaintiff-joint-veto rule are equal to
$90 (the average of the litigants’ mean valuations).88  But, as shown in Figure 3, a defendant-joint-
veto rule is much more efficient than a plaintiff-joint-veto rule because the off-diagonal quadrants
are more efficiently allocated to the plaintiff.  The 45-degree diagonal line represents the first-best
(perfect information) allocation—and it is evident in the figure that much more of the probability
mass in the off-diagonal quadrants lies below the first-best allocation line than above it.  In other
words, there is a greater probability that the plaintiff’s valuation will be larger than the defendants’
in these off-diagonal quadrants.  This simple example gives intuitive support for the claim that the
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plaintiff’s mean is higher than the
defendant’s.  The converse also tends to be
true (when the defendant’s mean exceeds
the plaintiff’s).
Appreciating the theoretical and
practical possibility of dual-chooser rules
in the law resuscitates the Restatement’s
focus on the parties’ relative valuations.
Although the relative size of the litigants’
mean valuations is not of primary importance in choosing between the two single-chooser
allocations, it is relevant not only to the choice between dual-chooser allocations, but also (as we are
about to see) to a choice between dual- and single-chooser allocations themselves.
D.  Selecting Among the Four Foundational Single-price Allocations
To summarize our results thus far, we have shown that there are four basic allocative
equilibria—two single-chooser and two dual-chooser allocations.  We have derived the optimal
damages for each, and shown that courts can divide the expected total payoff between the litigants
as it wishes, without affecting the allocative efficiency of any of the four classes of rules.  Finally,
as to selecting the optimal chooser or choosers, we have shown that:
(1) as between the two single-chooser rules, the litigant whose valuation has the higher
variance will tend to be the better single-chooser, and
 
(2) as between the two dual-chooser rules, courts should tend to allow either party to
veto allocations to the party with the lower mean.
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These last two results can be restated more mathematically as follows:
(1') when σΠ > σ∆, E[TP]Π > E[TP]∆, and
(2') when µΠ > µ∆, E[TP]∆JV > E[TP]ΠJV,
where E[TP] represents the expected total payoff, and the subscripts Π, ∆,  ∆JV, and ΠJV refer
respectively to the plaintiff-choice, defendant-choice, defendant-joint-veto and plaintiff-joint-veto
allocations.  In what follows we will refer to the first result as the “different variance” effect, and to
the second result as the “different mean” effect.  
Our final task is to try to identify which of the four rules is likely (for particular distributions
of litigant value) to maximize allocative efficiency.  In other words, we need to assess when the
better single-chooser rule dominates (or is dominated by) the better dual-chooser rule.  As an initial
matter, there are many circumstances in which the four basic equilibria will be allocatively
equivalent.  For example, if the litigants have identical and symmetric probability distributions of
valuations, then the four classes of rules will generate identical damages and identical expected total
payoffs.  Under such circumstances allocating the off-diagonal quadrants to either litigant will be
equally efficient—so the four different permutations of quadrant allocations generated by the four
basic allocations will be equivalent. 
But it turns out for more general probability distributions that the dual-chooser rules are
sometimes better than, and at other times inferior to, single-chooser rules.  Two heads can be better
than one; but sometimes one head—that is, a single allocative chooser—can be better than two.  
The optimal allocative rule will turn on the relative size of the “different mean” and
“different variance” effects discussed above.  When the difference in the litigants’ means is large
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89For example, for uncorrelated, uniform distributions it can be shown that when there is no
mean difference but only a variance difference, the better single-chooser rule dominates the better
dual-chooser rule and hence the better single-chooser rule is globally optimal (within the class of
single-price liability rules).  Conversely, when there is no variance difference, but only a mean
difference, it can be shown that the better dual-chooser rule dominates the better single-chooser rule
and hence the better dual-chooser rule is globally optimal.
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relative to the difference in the litigants’ variances, the dual-chooser rule that allows either party to
veto an allocation to the litigant with the lower mean will tend to dominate the other three basic
allocations.  In contrast, when the difference in the litigants’ variances is large relative to the
difference in the litigants’ means, then the single-chooser rule which allows the higher variance
litigant to allocate the entitlement will tend to allocatively dominate the other three basic
allocations.89
Put more intuitively, two choosers will tend to be better than one when the litigants have
relatively different means but relatively similar variances.  A sufficiently wide divergence in the
litigants’ means undermines the importance of a single-chooser rule because no single-chooser has
sufficient information to make a nuanced allocation.  By a "nuanced allocation," we mean nothing
more than an equilibrium in which the chooser makes more refined decisions about who will be
allocated the entitlement -- and at times allocates the entitlement to each litigant.  As the different-
mean effect comes to dominate the different-variance effect, single choosers will tend to make "un-
nuanced" decisions -- allocating the entitlement 100% of the time to a particular litigant.  Under such
conditions, a dual-chooser rule can increase allocative efficiency because the litigants’ combined
choices can identify circumstances when allocations to the litigant disfavored by single-chooser rules
are nonetheless efficient.
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90The example can also be easily converted to show how a plaintiff-joint-veto rule can
dominate any of the other three foundational allocations by simply reversing the identity of the
plaintiff and defendant probability distributions—so that the plaintiff’s value would be distributed
uniformly between $0 and $100, and the defendant’s value between $80 and $180.
91This is because the plaintiff’s valuation ranges from $80 to $180 and thus will always
exceed the $50 damage amount it would receive if it allocated the entitlement to the defendant.
92This is because the defendant’s valuation ranges from $0 to $100 and thus the $130 damage
amount it would have to pay if it chose to allocate the entitlment to the plaintiff would always exceed
the defendant’s valuation.
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For example, consider again a defendant whose value is uniformly distributed between $0
and $100 and a plaintiff whose value is uniformly distributed between $80 and $180 (see Figure 3).
Notice that the example is intentionally constructed so that the different-mean effect will dominate
the different-variance effect — the variances of the litigants’ values are equal (σ2Π = σ2∆ = $833.33),
but their means are different (µΠ = $130 > µ∆ = $50).  Our prior analysis shows that the equality of
variances will tend to make the plaintiff-choice rule allocatively equivalent to the defendant-choice
rule.  And the inequality in means tends to favor the defendant-joint-veto rule over the plaintiff-joint-
veto rule.90  But what still needs to be determined is whether the defendant-joint-veto rule dominates
either of the equivalent single-chooser rules.
As suggested above, it does, and here’s why.  Either of the single-chooser rules produces a
un-nuanced equilibrium -- allocating the entitlement exclusively to the plaintiff.  If the plaintiff is
the chooser and damages are set at the defendant’s (i.e., the non-chooser’s) mean of $50, then the
plaintiff will always allocate the entitlement to itself.91  And if the defendant is the chooser and
damages are set at the plaintiff’s mean value of $130, then the defendant will never allocate the
entitlement to itself.92  When the difference in means becomes sufficiently large, neither chooser has
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93See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
94Expected joint profits under a defendant-joint-veto allocation are equal to $130.10
(compared to the single-chooser analog of $130.00) When the single-chooser rules allocate the
entitlement exclusively to one litigant, the dual-chooser rules can never produce a lower expected
total payoff, because dual-chooser damages can be set so as to always produce an unnuanced
equilibrium.  For example, if the defendant-joint-veto damages were set at $130, then the defendant
would always veto allocating the entitlement to itself.
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sufficient information to make a nuanced allocation. 
But a dual-chooser rule improves allocative efficiency because the joint choice of the litigants
allows the entitlement to go to the defendant when this allocation is more efficient.  The dual-
chooser rule allows the low mean litigant (here, the defendant) to end up with the entitlement when
she actually has an unusually high value and when the high mean litigant (the plaintiff) has an
unusually low value.  As discussed above,93 the optimal dual-chooser damages for this example equal
$90.  With a single-chooser rule, it would be inefficient to allow either the defendant or the plaintiff
as a single chooser to confront a damage amount of $90, because such an amount would cause the
single chooser to inefficiently allocate the entitlement to the defendant too often.  But the defendant-
joint-veto rule can effectively use $90 damages because under this rule the defendant will only be
allocated the entitlement when the defendant’s value exceeds $90 and when the plaintiff’s value falls
short of $90.  This more nuanced equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3.  Giving both litigants a say in
the ultimate allocation increases the expected total payoff.94
The dominance of the dual chooser rules when there is a large difference in the court's
estimate of the litigants' mean valuations resolves an embarrassing disconnect between the previous
analysis of liability rules and cases like Boomer, where the defendant's value of pollution was
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95See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).  Whalen v. Union
Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913), provides an extreme example of some courts'
willingness to issue injunctions where the cost to the defendant far exceeds the plaintiff's benefit.
In the Union Bag case (discussed later in Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872) the plaintiff's harm was
assessed at $100 per year while the cost of complying with the injunction was the permanent closing
of a mill representing an investment of more than $1,000,000.  See 101 N.E. at 805.  The New York
Court of Appeals concluded: "Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with
the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason for refusing an injunction."
Id. at 806.   See Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions
and Contracts, 148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 45 (1999).
96The single chooser rules can also be distributively embarrassing when there is a great
disparity in the litigants' mean valuations.  Such rules can force the policy makers at times to
confront unpalatable divisions.  For example, if a court decided that the residents in Boomer were
the more efficient choosers, it would have to choose between a call rule which might force resident's
to pay a large sum to stop the pollution and a put rule which might force the polluter to disgorge all
of its expected profits from polluting.  Our foregoing convexity result, however, resolves the
distributive embarrassment under either the single- or dual-chooser implementations.
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estimated by the court to be much greater than the residents' value of non-pollution.95  Simple single-
chooser rules of either the call or put varieties (Rules 2, 4, 5 and 6) are allocatively embarrassing,
because setting the damages equal to the non-chooser's mean would produce un-nuanced equilibria
that are allocatively indistinguishable from simply giving the polluter a property rule interest in the
entitlement (Rule 3).  A Boomer-like resident confronting an allocative price set equal to the
polluter's high mean value would never allocate the entitlement to her self, and an Atlantic Cement-
like polluter confronting an allocative price set equal to the resident's low mean value would never
fail to allocate the entitlement to itself.  When the litigants' means vary greatly, single chooser rules
are allocatively a non-event.96  In contrast, the dual chooser rules intentionally seek out a damage
amount in between the litigant's mean valuations -- where the litigant's probability distributions
overlap -- so as to produce more efficient nuanced equilibria.  Unlike with single chooser rules, the
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97Of course, if the divergence in means is too large (or more particularly, if there is no overlap
in the litigants' probability functions), then a more nuanced equilibrium is neither feasible (nor
desirable) even under the dual chooser rules.  
98See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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court is not forced to set damages at either the plaintiff's or the defendant's divergent mean values.97
Dual-chooser rules, however, are not always preferable.  When the litigants have relatively
different variances but similar means, it will instead be allocatively optimal for the court to
implement a single-chooser rule—granting the allocative choice to the chooser with the larger
variance.  The intuition here is that one head can be better than two when one of the heads is
relatively ignorant.  When there is a large difference in the litigants’ value variances, it may be better
to exclude the low variance litigant from having any influence on the ultimate allocation.  A litigant
with a relatively small variance has very little of an informational advantage over the court or her
adversary.  When the different variance effect dominates the different mean effect, it is better to have
a single chooser than to allow a second litigant with very little private information to muck up the
allocation.  
Michael Heller in recent writing on the “anti-commons” has persuasively argued that there
is an efficient number of vetoers to the deployment of entitlements.98 The traditional commons
problem is when the number of potential vetoers is too small—no one can veto the deployment of
the entitlement.  But an analogous anti-commons problem exists when there are too many vetoers
who can block the deployment of an entitlement.  Heller's favorite examples concern modern Russia,
where an entrepreneur may need the approval of dozens of organizations before being able to open
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99See id. at 633-42.
100The example can also be easily converted to show how a plaintiff-joint-veto rule can
dominate any of the other three foundational allocations by simply reversing the identity of the
plaintiff and defendant probability distributions—so that the plaintiff’s value was distributed
uniformly between $0 and $100, and the defendant’s value between $80 and $180.
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a business.99  Our finding that single-chooser rules can dominate dual-chooser (joint veto) rules
suggests that the anti-commons inefficiency can kick-in even when the number of vetoers is just two.
To see this possibility in a concrete example, consider again a defendant whose value is
uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 and a plaintiff whose value is distributed between $25
and $75.  Notice now that this example is intentionally constructed so that the different variance
effect will dominate the different mean effect—the means of litigants’ value are equal (µΠ = µ∆ =
$50), but that their variances are different  (σ2∆ = $833.33 > σ2Π = $208.33).  As our prior analysis
showed, the equality of means will tend to make the two dual-chooser rules allocatively equivalent.
And the inequality in variances suggests that the defendant-choice rule will dominate the plaintiff-
choice rule.100  But what still needs to be shown is why the defendant-choice (single-chooser) rule
dominates either of the equivalent dual-chooser rules.
The problem with the dual-chooser regime when there is a large difference in the litigant
variances is that it allows the poorly informed chooser (the chooser with a low variance) to have too
much control over the entitlement’s ultimate allocation.  For example, as shown in Figure 4's
depiction of the defendant-joint-veto rule, even when the plaintiff’s value is higher than the nominal
damage price, this does not provide very good assurance that the plaintiff’s value is higher than the
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Indeed, as discussed above, the relative inferiority of the plaintiff as a chooser in this example
causes the optimal damages for the defendant-joint-veto rule to exceed the means of both parties
(D∆JV = $62.50 > µΠ = µ∆ = $50).  Because the problem with the defendant-joint-veto rule is that it
gives the plaintiff too much power to allocate the entitlement to itself, the optimal damages under
this rule are raised to reduce the plaintiff’s incentives to allocate the entitlement to itself.  Because
of the litigants’ difference in information, it is better to induce the defendant to inefficiently under-
take (that is, to allocate the entitlement too often to the plaintiff) in order to restrict the poorly
informed plaintiff’s incentive to over-take (that is, to
allocate the entitlement too often to itself).  The fact that
optimal joint veto damages are set outside the litigants’
mean valuations is evidence that one of the choosers is
more inefficient than the other—and therefore evidence
that dual-chooser rules will tend to be inefficient relative
to single-chooser allocations.
The graphical difference between these rules
concerns which litigant will be allocated the entitlement
in quadrant II.  The defendant-choice rule allocates this quadrant to the defendant, which enhances
allocative efficiency.  Witness Figure 4, which shows that more of the probability space in this
quadrant is filled by situations in which the defendant’s valuation exceeds the plaintiff’s (as seen
from the fact that in this quadrant the area above the 45-degree first-best efficiency line is greater
than the area below this line).  Divesting the plaintiff of allocative power through the use of the
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dominates the plaintiff-joint-veto regime.  Under a plaintiff-joint-veto rule, the defendant cannot
prevent the plaintiff from under-taking—putting the entitlement to the defendant even though the
high-mean defendant has a seriously low valuation (as in much of the lower-left quadrant). The
optimal damages under a plaintiff-joint-veto rule are lowered below the litigants’ mean value in
order to increase the poorly informed plaintiff’s incentive to unilaterally allocate the entitlement to
the defendant, but it turns out to be even better to give all of the allocative power to the
defendant—through a single-chooser rule—than to shift the relative allocative decision making
through a dual-chooser rule with distorted damages.
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simpler defendant-choice rule lowers the optimal damages back down to $50 and increases the
expected joint pay off from $60.54 (induced by the defendant-joint-veto rule) to $62.50 (induced by
the defendant-choice rule).101
The foregoing two examples were intentionally constructed to highlight the impacts of the
different mean and different variance effects by alternatively assuming one or the other of these
differences to be zero.  But, more likely, the litigants’ distributions will display a mixture of both
mean and variance differences.  In such cases the choice of the most efficient allocation will turn on
which of these difference effects dominates.  Figure 5 graphically shows which of the four basic
allocations will dominate—holding the difference in variance constant—as we change the relative
means of the two litigants.  For example, in panel (a), imagine that the plaintiff’s valuation is
uniformly distributed over a $100 range, while the defendant’s valuation is uniformly distributed
over only a $50 range.  This assumption of course implies that the variance of the plaintiff’s value
is greater than the variance of the defendant’s value.  The relative means of the litigants can then be
added to the figure by drawing in a particular 45-degree locus of points in which the litigants’ values
are equal.  Thus, the 45-degree line toward the upper left-hand corner depicts an example in which
the plaintiff’s mean is greater than the defendant’s, while the 45-degree line toward the lower-right
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hand corner depicts an example in which the defendant’s mean is greater than the plaintiff’s.  
Panel (a) shows that—holding the variance difference constant—as the mean difference
varies (from a higher plaintiff mean to a higher defendant mean), three different foundational
allocations become alternatively the most efficient.  For sufficiently large mean differences in the
plaintiff’s favor, the different mean effect dominates the variance effect and the defendant-joint-veto
allocation is most efficient.102  For intermediate differences in the litigant means, the different
variance effect dominates, so that the plaintiff-choice rule dominates.  And for sufficiently large
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mean differences in the defendant’s favor, the different mean effect again dominates the variance
effect—this time rendering the plaintiff-joint-veto allocation the most efficient.
Panel (b) works out the optimal allocations for an example in which the variance of the
defendant’s valuations is greater than the plaintiff’s.  When the different mean effect dominates, one
of the dual-chooser rules is most efficient; when the difference in the litigants’ means is not as large,
the variance effect dominates and the defendant-choice rule is most efficient.
In sum, we have now provided a complete analysis of the four basic single-price allocations.
We have shown what damages optimize allocative efficiency for each type of allocation.  We have
shown when each type of the four allocations will tend to be allocatively optimal.  And we have
shown how courts are free to independently distribute the expected payoff between the litigants. 
III.  SECOND (AND HIGHER) ORDER RULES
In a previous article, Ian Ayres and Jack Balkin analyzed a type of regime that was governed
by what they called a “second-order” liability rule.103  Second-order rules are types of dual-chooser
rules because each litigant makes successive allocative  choices.  But unlike the dual-chooser rules
analyzed above, the second-order rules do not rely on a single judicially-determined allocative price.
Instead, second-order rules force one litigant in making an allocative choice to confront one
allocative (exercise) price, and force the other litigant to confront a different allocative (exercise)
price.
For example, if both of the plaintiff and defendant values are uniformly distributed between
$0 and $100, one type of optimal second-order liability rule would induce the defendant to exercise
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an option to take when its value is higher than $33.33, but would induce the plaintiff to take back
the entitlement when its entitlement is greater than $66.66.  Ayres and Balkin showed that second-
order rules mimicked the allocations of an auction with minimum bid increments.104  This allocative
equilibrium is graphically displayed in Figure 6.  The defendant-joint-veto allocation is a type of
second-order liability rule, but one in
which the first- and second-order exercise
prices are constrained to be the same.  
Ayres and Balkin also showed that
allowing the exercise prices to vary
induces strategic taking behavior by the
initial decision maker.  For example, in the
foregoing hypothetical, a defendant with a
private valuation of only $33 would find it
advantageous to exercise an initial call
option to take an entitlement for $33.33
(thus, paying more than her value) because doing so might induce the plaintiff to take back and pay
$66.66.  In order to induce the optimal taking strategies (of $33.33 and $66.66), the nominal damage
amounts would need to be set at $44.44 (for the defendant’s call option) and $66.66 (for the
plaintiff’s take-back call option).  Because of this incentive for strategic exercise, the exercise prices
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105The same allocation might also be induced by:
(3) Π: - put(Low) + call(High) ∆: E + put(Low) - call(High)
Under the third implementation (3), the defendant has the initial entitlement and a put with a low
exercise price, while the plaintiff is given a call with a high exercise (which the plaintiff and
defendant might be called upon to exercise simultaneously).  The entitlement would only end up with
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of second-order rules do not induce transparently obvious player strategies.
Like the constrained dual-chooser rules, there are multiple option variations that will induce
allocatively equivalent second order allocations.  For example, what we will call the “defendant
unconstrained joint veto” rule might be produced by either:
(1) Π: E - call(Low) + call(High) ∆: + call(Low) - call(High)
(2) Π: E + put(High) - put(Low) ∆: - put(High) + put(Low),
where the parenthetical Low’s and High’s are used merely to indicate the ordinal size of the two
exercise prices.
In the first implementation (1), the plaintiff (a) is given the initial entitlement, (b) is subject
to a defendant’s call option, but (c) also has a call option to take back at a higher price.  Like the
earlier defendant-joint-veto allocation, this rules allows either litigant to veto the transfer of the
entitlement to the defendant.  The defendant can veto the transfer of the entitlement to itself by
refusing to exercise its initial call option; and even if the defendant’s call is exercised, the plaintiff
can veto the transfer by exercising its take-back call option.  Alternatively, under the second
implementation (2), the plaintiff is given (a) the initial entitlement and (b) an option to put at a high
exercise price, but (c) the defendant is given an option to put the entitlement back to the plaintiff at
a lower exercise price.105  An analogous second-order allocation can be implemented by what we call
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the defendant if neither litigant vetoed such an allocation by exercising its option.  While these
options might be simultaneously exercised, we would still expect non-transparent strategies, as each
party would hedge on its decision to exercise hoping that the other litigant would exercise at a more
favorable price.
106124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
107Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 716.  Jon Hanson and Matt Stowe were the first to see this
unusual aspect of Vincent.  See Jon Hanson & Matt Stowe, Lecture Notes, Torts, Harvard Law
School (Fall 1996) (on file with The Yale Law Journal).  Robert Ellickson long ago also proposed
a modification of nuisance rules that would amount to a common law implementation of a second-
order rule.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:  Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
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“plaintiff unconstrained joint veto” rules simply by reversing the foregoing plaintiff and defendant
allocations.  
While these second-order rules may seem the most bizarre of an ever expanding universe of
“liability” rules, Ayres and Balkin showed that a second-order rule was implicitly implemented in
the venerable common law chestnut, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.106  In that case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held a shipowner liable when his ship damaged a dock while he attempted
to moor the ship during a storm—but the court simultaneously acknowledged that the dock owner
would have had to pay damages to the ship owner if the dock owner had subsequently unmoored the
defendant’s ship, causing it to be damaged.  As Ayres and Balkin note:
Vincent [is] a vivid example of how the common law protects an option to take an
entitlement (a liability rule) with another liability rule.  The dock owner holds the
initial entitlement to the physical security of the dock.  The shipowner (because of
the exigencies of the storm) has a first-stage option to “take” the dock by mooring the
ship to it and by paying damages for any injury that results.  The dock owner has a
second-stage option to unmoor the ship, but at a cost: The dock owner gives up a
cause of action against the shipowner for damages and exposes himself to tort
liability for any damages to the ship and its crew.107
Under Vincent, both the ship and dock owners have a say in the ultimate allocation of the dock, and
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108The real difficulty will be for a judge to reduce her assessments of valuation to a
probability density function.  If this is accomplished (and there are interactive software that already
help quantiphobes undertake just this task by asking a series of yes/no questions), it is fairly trivial
for a piece of software to numerically calculate the optimal damages.  We guess that more
complicated computational problems are surmounted everytime someone dials a phone number.
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while there was no indication that the court intended to set allocatively optimal rules, the potential
damages in the first and second stages were certainly not constrained to be the same number (in
contrast with the foregoing single-price, dual-chooser rules).
This section extends Ayres and Balkin’s previous analysis by showing more generally how
courts should tailor second-order damages, as well as by showing that our convexity result can be
applied to second-order rules to again decouple a court’s distributive and allocative concerns.
Finally, our goal in this section is to compare these unconstrained dual-chooser allocations to the
four single-price allocations.  Intuitively, it should not be surprising that a less constrained rule
should dominate more constrained rules, and indeed we find that, absent transaction costs, second-
order rules dominate.
A.  Selecting Optimal Damages
Calculating optimal damages is computationally difficult —even more so than solving the
dual-chooser optimization equation outlined above.  We readily admit that it will outstrip the
computational capacity and temperament of judges.  Still, it is possible to make some progress on
the underlying process that would guide a judge inclined to make such an allocation (possibly with
the aid of a fairly simple piece of computer software).108  First, it is useful to break the task into two
parts: (1) identifying the optimal “pivot values” that define when a chooser will optimally allocate
the entitlement to itself or the other litigant; and (2) identifying the nominal damages that induce the
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109Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 717, proved that the dispositive taking principal
maximized allocative efficiency when the litigants's valuations were uniformly distributed and
conjectured that the principal would also hold true for more general distributions.  In the Appendix,
infra at 111, we prove this to be true.
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litigants to adopt particular pivot values as their equilibrium strategies.
The first task, identifying the optimal pivot value, has a surprisingly simple intuition, which
we call the “dispositive takings principle.”  To see how this principle might work, consider again a
second-order regime in which the defendant has a first-stage call option to take, and the plaintiff has
a second-stage option to take back at a higher price.  While it makes superficial sense for a court to
want to induce takings when the taker thinks her value is greater than the expected value of the takee,
this approach ignores the fact that, in a second-order regime, many of the first-stage takings will not
be dispositive.  Some of the first-stage takees will have values higher than the expected value of the
taker, and they will protect their interests by taking back.  The optimal pivot values should focus on
the allocations of particular choosers that will be final, or dispositive.  Hence, optimal exercise prices
for second-order rules should induce the first-stage taker to take whenever the taker’s private
valuation is greater than the expected valuation of takees who will not take back.109  The dispositive
takings principle requires that dispositive takings must on average increase welfare.
While the dispositive takings principle has intuitive appeal, implementing it would require
a judge to simultaneously solve a system of two equations for the two unknown pivot values:
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where Pivot∆ and PivotΠ represent the pivot values at which defendants and plaintiffs choose to
exercise their taking and take-back options respectively.110  The first pivot equation asks what is the
plaintiff’s expected value given that the plaintiff will not take back.  It is this class of plaintiffs for
whom the defendant’s taking will be dispositive.  The second pivot equation asks what is the
defendant’s expected value given that she initially exercised her option to take.  It is this class of
defendant for whom the plaintiff’s taking back will be dispositive.
But even after undertaking the arduous task of calculating the optimal pivot values, a court
would then still —because of the first-stage strategic exercise incentive—need to solve a second
system of equations to determine what nominal damage amounts will induce the desired pivot
strategies.  Because second-stage takings are non-strategic, the second-stage damages are identical
to the second-stage pivot value:
 D Pivotπ π= .
But the first-stage damages (because of the problem of strategic first-stage taking) are more
complicated:
D P v Pivot Pivot P v Pivot Pivot∆ ∆= < + >( ) ( ) .π π π π π
Notice that first-stage damages are a weighted average of the two optimal pivot values (with the
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112An example with the much simpler uniform distribution is derived in Ayres & Balkin,
supra note 15, at 422.
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weights concerning the probability of the plaintiff’s value being above or below the plaintiff’s take-
back pivot value).  
For example, if plaintiff and defendant have identical probability density functions that take
on a quadratic form with zero probability mass at $0 and $100,111 then it can be shown applying the
foregoing dispositive takings equations that the players’ joint payoffs are maximized if the defendant
to take when its valuation is greater than $37.80 and the plaintiff takes back when it’s valuation is
greater than $62.20.  And to induce these pivot values, it is necessary for a court to set first stage
damages for defendant taking equal to $45.62 and second-stage damages for plaintiff taking back
equal to $62.20.112
Thus, while optimal damages for second-order liability rules are tractable for any possible
value distributions, they are (even) less likely than any of the foregoing variants to be accurately
implemented by the present-day judiciary.
B.  Selecting the Distribution
Continuing bravely on, we find that if a court could determine the allocatively optimal
damages, it would again be possible to vary the litigants’ individual expected payoffs without
affecting the litigants’ allocative choice.  In other words, it is possible to extend our previous
convexity result.
Consider, for instance, the familiar example of two litigants whose valuations are uniformly
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113Notice how this equilibrium is consistent with the dispositive takings principle.  The
defendant only takes when its value is higher that those plaintiffs who will not take back.  The class
of plaintiffs who will not take back have valuations ranging from $0 to $66.66, and the defendant
will only take when its value is greater than the mid-point in this range, $33.33.  Similarly, the
plaintiff will only take back when its value is higher than those defendants from whom it is taking.
The class of defendants from whom a plaintiff might take back has valuations ranging from $33.33
to $100, and the plaintiff will only take back when its value is greater than the midpoint in this range,
$66.66.
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distributed between $0 and $100.  As discussed earlier, one example of a second-order rule with
optimal damages would give the defendant a first-stage taking (call) option with a $44.44 exercise
price and the plaintiff a second-stage take-back (call) option with a $66.66 exercise price.  These
nominal damages will induce the optimal pivot strategies in that the defendant will take when its
value is greater than $33.33 and the plaintiff will take back when its value is greater than $66.66.113
But the same pivot strategies can be induced by a regime that gives the defendant the first-
stage choice of paying $24.44 to the plaintiff to take the entitlement (DC= $24.44) or receiving $20
from the plaintiff if it does not take (DNC = -$20), and giving the plaintiff the same second-stage
choice of paying $66.66 to take back the entitlement (DC = $66.66; DNC = $0).  Under such a rule,
the defendant will still perceive a $44.44 cost to taking in the first stage, and thus will continue find
it worthwhile to strategically take whenever its value is greater than $33.33.  But (again) by changing
the first-stage option into a “Pay or be Paid” rule, this implementation effectively shifts some of the
expected total payoff from the plaintiff and toward the defendant.  All that is allocatively important
is that the difference between DC and DNC be equal to the nominal damages that would be optimal
under a more traditional call (or put) rule.  As emphasized above, it is computationally awkward to
calculate this initial number, but it is not difficult for a court by moving DC and DNC in lockstep to
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create “Pay or be Paid” or “Pay or Pay” rules that produce distributively different, but allocatively
identical, equilibria.  Even when implementing second-order rules, a court’s distributive decision
can be independent of its allocative decision.  So just as there is an infinite class of rules that
implement two single-chooser allocations, and an infinite class of rules that implement two dual-
chooser allocations, there turns out to be an infinite class of rules that implement the two
foundational second-order allocations—the defendant-unconstrained-joint-veto allocation and the
plaintiff-unconstrained-joint-veto allocation.
C.  Selecting the Chooser 
Which of these two second-order equilibria will be allocatively superior -- the "unconstrained
plaintiff-joint-veto" rule or the "unconstrained defendant-joint-veto" rule?  The answer parallels our
analysis of the constrained dual-chooser rules—it depends on the litigants’ relative means.  The
overarching principle continues to be that as between the two second-order rules, courts should tend
to allow either party to veto allocations to the party with the lower mean.  This means that the
"unconstrained defendant-joint-veto" equilibrium will tend to dominate the "unconstrained plaintiff-
joint-veto" equilibrium when
µΠ > µ∆.
For example, imagine that the defendant’s valuation is uniformly distributed between $0 and $100,
and that the plaintiff’s valuation is uniformly distributed between $80 and $180.  It can be shown
that the optimal pivot values for a defendant-unconstrained-joint-veto rule are equal to $86.66 and
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which when solved yield the values in the text.  The nominal damages that would induce these pivot
taking values are $92.43 for the defendant’s taking and $93.33 for the plaintiff taking back.
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116See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 727 fig.1.
78
$93.33 for the defendant and plaintiff, respectively.114  In contrast, the optimal pivot values for a
plaintiff-unconstrained-joint-veto rule are equal to $60 for the plaintiff  and $120 for the defendant
respectively.115  Each of these pivot values are outside the range of the litigant’s valuation
distribution and as a result the plaintiff-unconstrained-joint veto rule with optimal damages would
always allocate the entitlement to the plaintiff.  The two allocative equilibria induced by the two
rules (with optimal pivot values) are graphically depicted in Figure 7.116  As shown in the figure, the
"unconstrained defendant-joint-veto" rule is more efficient than an "unconstrained plaintiff-joint-
veto" rule (as can be seen by the relative difference in misallocatted entitlements).  The defendant-
unconstrained-joint veto rule on net does a better job of allocating the entitlement to the defendant
in the unusual circumstances when the defendant has the higher value, whereas the plaintiff-
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D.  Selecting Among the Six Foundational Allocations
Finally, it is useful to compare the relative efficiency of all six foundational allocations.  If
courts could accurately calculate optimal damages for second-order rules, the better second-order
rule would always dominate all other rules—in the sense of producing at least as high an expected
total payoff for the litigants as any of the other five allocations.  This is intuitively obvious because
the second-order rules are less constrained than either single chooser or dual chooser rules.  The
court sets not one, but two allocative prices and thus has more freedom to harness the private
information of both litigants.  Setting two (or more) allocative prices allows a court to implement
an internal auction -- where each taking at a sequentially higher (or with puts lower) price effectively
allows the individual litigants to credibly signal more information about their private valuation.117
Heuristically, these less constrained liability rules allow the court to make more nuanced assignments
of allocative authority.  Just as the convexity result allows the courts to distribute the expected
payoffs as they see fit, the higher-order liability rules allow the court to distribute the allocative
power as they see fit -- instead of giving one side or the other the sole allocative authority (as with
single chooser rules) or giving the two parties symmetric allocative authority (as with the constrained
dual chooser rules).
More prosaically, second order rules can never be dominated because with the appropriate
choice of damages these rules can themselves implement the literal equilibria of either the single-
chooser or the dual-chooser rules.  Second-order rules could be made to implement single-chooser
allocations by setting the first-stage exercise price at the non-chooser’s value and then setting the
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order rules can achieve a higher expected total payoff.  See id. at 727-78.  Higher-order liability rules
implement more refined auctions (with smaller minimum bid increments), and as a theoretical matter
these rules in the limit can produce first-best efficiency.
119Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 717 show, for example, that if as the transaction costs of
taking or calculating damages increase that single price rules will tend to dominate multiple
allocative price rules.
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second-stage price at a sufficiently prohibitive amount so that it would not be exercised.  And
second-order rules could be made to implement dual-chooser allocations by simply setting the first-
and second-stage exercise prices equal to one another.118
But much as we are attracted to the elegant way in which second-order rules harness the
information of both litigants—even when one litigant is relatively poorly informed, we believe that
there are many pragmatic drawbacks to implementing second-order rules that rightly refocus our
attention on the single-price dual-chooser rules as the best pragmatic alternative that courts will often
have for harnessing both litigants’ private information to allocate an entitlement.119  The rules, by
definition, only require the courts to calculate a single allocative price—which in the normal case
will be something close to the average of the litigants’ mean values.  And the single-price dual-
chooser rules analyzed above induce transparent, dominant strategies that both the court and the
litigants can readily understand.  If dual-chooser damages are set at $D∆JV under a defendant-joint-
veto rule, then the entitlement will be allocated to the defendant only if vΠ < D∆JV < v∆.  The relative
simplicity and transparency of such rules suggest that the theoretical dominance of second-order
regimes does not undermine our initial efforts to identify how courts should select within an
admittedly constrained class of single-price rules.
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121This point is stressed in Ayres & Talley, supra note 9.
122See Rose, supra note 15, at 2189.
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IV.  EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS
In this section, we relax many of the more stringent assumptions of the foregoing analysis
and assess the extent to which the assumptions limit the model's applicability or its normative
implications.  
A.  Administrative Costs
The foregoing analysis ignored costs of administering the liability rules.  Taking these costs
into account is likely to drive efficiency-minded lawmakers toward simpler rules.  Ayres and Balkin
have previously shown, for example, that if as the transaction costs of taking or calculating damages
increase, single price rules will tend to dominate higher-order liability rules (which entail the
calculation of multiple allocative prices).120  Indeed, when bargaining is not possible, the costs of
administering liability rule regimes militate toward the use of property rules.  Property rules tend to
deter nonconsensual takings and thus avoid the costs of administering a liability rule regime.  But
when transaction costs are relatively low, the litigation costs involved in administering a liability rule
regime can somewhat counterintuitively facilitate greater allocative efficiency.121  Under a liability
regime, litigation costs give the parties an additional impetus to negotiate and hence can be a but-for
cause of making liability rules more efficient than property rules.
Carol Rose has also stressed that courts may need to incur non-trivial costs in determining
which parties should have a potential claim to ultimate ownership of particular entitlements.122  Costs
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of determining who owns what entitlements will again militate in favor of property rules, but should
not greatly impact the type of liability rules.  The foregoing suggests that the optimal tailoring of
liability regime will turn on an assessment of how the litigants' valuations are distributed.  We will
return to these issues again when we consider the associated problems of "numerosity."
B.  Alternative Informational Assumptions
The foregoing analysis made imperfect information assumptions that are standard in the law
and economics literature -- namely that the probability distributions of the litigants is (after trial)
common knowledge, but that only litigants known their own valuation.123   Here, we consider three
variations on these assumptions: (a) the litigants are imperfectly informed about their own
valuations: (b) the litigants' probability functions are not common knowledge; and (c) courts
systematically mis-estimate the probability distributions of the litigants' value.
The possibility that litigants do not precisely know their own valuation is not a major
limitation to our analysis.  While it is possible that the prospective value of owning an entitlement
may not be known by a litigant with precision, the litigant nonetheless may be able to estimate a
certain equivalent amount of cash that would leave her indifferent between owning the entitlement
or having this additional cash amount.  Just as individuals often buy and sell entitlements for discrete
cash amounts when they do not precisely know what the future value of ownership to them will be.
As long as the individual litigants are better informed than the court, liability rules -- by
privatizing the ultimate allocative authority -- can enhance ex post efficiency.  In mathematical
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terms, as long as a litigant's beliefs about her valuation probability function are less volatile than the
court's belief's about the litigant's valuation, the litigant will have an informational advantage over
the court in ultimately allocating the entitlement.124
Even if litigants know their own valuation, one might worry that they might not (contrary to
our model's assumption) be able to assess the probability distribution of the other party.  We believe
that this is also not a large concern.  Liability rules do not require a chooser to directly assess the
probability functions of her adversary -- rather a chooser needs to confront the court-determined
damage amount (what we have called the allocative price).  Court-appointed choosers do not need
to observe non-chooser valuations as long as a court, after discovery and trial can estimate a
valuation distribution sufficiently to determine optimal single or dual chooser damages.125  And as
stressed above, single-chooser rules will tend to simplify the court's decision by only asking the court
to estimate the mean of the litigant with the less speculative valuation.  Of course, the less
speculative valuation may still, from the court's perspective, be quite speculative, but courts only
need to be able to make an unbiased estimate in order to harness the litigant's private information
in allocating the entitlement.
A more serious informational concern would be if courts' estimates of the litigants' valuation
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distributions were for some reason systematically biased.  For example, if courts in implementing
single chooser rules systematically underestimated (overestimated) the non-chooser means, then they
would set damages too low (high) and would induce the chooser to inefficiently allocate the
entitlement too often (rarely) to itself.  If higher branches of government (appellate courts or the
legislature) realize that lower branches (trial courts/juries) systematically underestimate the mean
value of residents, a standard response is that the higher branch might force the lower branch to
eschew liability rules altogether and instead give the residents the pollution entitlement protected by
a property rule.  But the foregoing analysis suggests that an alternative response may be more
efficient and that is for the higher branch to force the lower branch to eschew defendant-choice rules
-- which turn on the court's assessment of the residents' mean value -- and instead to use plaintiff-
choice rules -- which turn on the trial court's potentially better assessment of the polluter's mean
value.  
If the valuation assessments of the more authoritative branches of government are also
biased, the allocation problem becomes truly intractable.  We readily admit that our model will not
perform well, but neither will most other allocative regimes. 
C.  Unintentional Taking
Our option model has quintessentially been about intentional takings.  One or both litigants
makes an intentional choice to exercise a particular option or not.  In many contexts, this assumption
is reasonable.  Potential defendants at times make deliberate decisions to impair plaintiffs'
entitlements.  And the election of remedies by plaintiffs to seek an injunction or monetary damages
is almost always appropriately modeled as deliberate.
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However, many (if not most) torts concern unintentional takings.  It is reasonable to ask
whether our models have anything to say to this large class settings.  We believe they do.  First,
unintentional takings increase the ability of courts to implement single chooser rules -- especially
plaintiff choice rules.  If Calabresi inadvertently and non-strategically encroaches on Melamed's land,
then courts have additional freedom to implement a true plaintiff choice rule -- by giving Melamed
the unilateral allocative decision based on a single allocative price.  In contrast, with regard to
deliberate encroachments, courts may not be able to implement a pure plaintiff choice rule because
eventually potential encroachers will take into account the second-stage plaintiff choice when
deciding whether or not in the first stage to encroach.
Second, and more speculatively, an options model of deliberate taking may have something
to tell us about negligence regimes.  Even when a potential defendant does not make a deliberate
decision to take a plaintiff's entitlement, the defendant often does make a deliberate choice to take
a certain amount of care.  Choosing a level of care in some contexts can be thought of as being
tantamount to choosing the probability that an accident will occur.  Or put more in the argot of
finance, by choosing a level of care, potential defendants are choosing the probability that they will
exercise their takings option.  Setting damages equal to the non-chooser's mean value (i.e., the
plaintiff's mean value of impairment) will induce the takings only when the value of probabilistic
takings (in saved due care costs) is greater than the plaintiff's average loss.  Thus, it is possible to
restate the Learned Hand rule in option terms -- but often not much is gained from the translation.
Many torts are not amenable to plaintiff choice, because once an entitlement has been destroyed there
is no prospect of asking the plaintiff whether she would prefer the thing itself (e.g., her arm) instead
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of cash.
But even with regard to negligent taking there may be some circumstances where a second-
stage plaintiff election of remedy is possible and the foregoing analysis may be relevant.  If Epstein
negligently takes Calabresi’s galoshes at the theater, common law courts can give (and traditionally
have given) Calabresi the option of whether he wants the shoes or the money.126  The court in setting
the damage amount may be creating a kind of dual chooser rule which will impact both the due care
with which Epstein examines galoshes at the theater and Calabresi’s decision whether to seek
injunctive of damage relief.
D.  Numerosity
Our previous discussion has relentlessly concerned bilateral disputes.  We have assumed that
there is only one plaintiff and one defendant; and we have assumed that there are no third-parties
who might contend for being the highest valuer of the entitlement.  Both of these assumptions
characterize a non-trivial amount of real-world litigation.  For example, in Copart Industries v.
Consolidated Edison, a particular type of pollution from a ConEd plant disrupted the ability of a
single plaintiff to continue its new car preparation business.127  However, there are many nuisance
disputes in which one or both sides of the litigation will involve multiple litigants.  In particular, the
tendency of a pollution to spread means that multiple plaintiffs may be affected by a single
defendant's effluence.128  Krier and Schwab have seized on the difference in numerosity to argue that
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defendant's will tend to be the more efficient chooser because they are less numerous.129  As applied
to our analysis, Krier and Schwab would be arguing that defendant choice rules -- including the Rule
2 call-option implementation and the Rule 5 put-option implementation -- would tend to dominate
plaintiff choice rules.  We agree that the additional collective action difficulties of a diffuse plaintiff
class will -- all else equal -- tend to militate toward the use of defendant choice rules.  And our
decoupling result improves upon Krier and Schwab by showing that there is a continuum of
defendant choice rules that can equally harness the defendant's private information while providing
more nuanced distributive possibilities.  
But we disagree with Krier and Schwab's seemingly exclusive focus on numerosity as the
determinant of the more efficient chooser.  Instead, we believe that the more efficient chooser will
also turn importantly on which party has a greater informational advantage relative to the court.  All
else equal, the party who from the court's perspective has the more volatile valuation will be the
more efficient chooser.  
In many nuisance disputes numerosity and volatility will push the court in different
directions.  The plaintiffs in nuisance disputes are often more numerous than the defendant/polluter,
but these plaintiffs also are likely to have more speculative valuations.  It is often easier for courts
to measure the economic costs of abating or discontinuing pollution than it is for courts to assess the
non-economic damages of pollution to surrounding residents.  Even though multiple residents will
often have high costs of collective decision-making, they will also often have more relevant private
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information available (knowing how much pollution really harms them).130
At times, it will be better for courts to give the choice to multiple residents and accept the
resultant collective-action problems than to give the polluter the choice and disregard the residents’
private information.  For example, we believe that the residents in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement might
have been the better chooser than the polluter—notwithstanding their relative numerosity—because
the court had a more difficult time estimating the value of the entitlement to the residents.  While
we concede that numerosity will often militate against giving the choice to multiple residents, the
variance effect will often militate in favor of giving the residents precisely this choice.
A second way in which our two player models limits the applicability of our analysis
concerns the exclusion of potential third party claimants for ultimate ownership of the entitlement
in question.  In a world in which three or more different parties are potentially the most efficient
ultimate owner of the entitlement, it will become more difficult to implement a liability rule regime.
Absent bargaining, property rules will, however, also do badly in allocating the entitlement to the
most efficient owner -- unless the imperfectly informed court by chance can allocate the entitlement
to the highest valuer.  When bargaining is feasible, the multiplicity of potential highest valuers
militates toward property rules.  Liability rules (a) by failing to allocate claims to potentially high
valuers or (b) by allocating claims to people who are not high valuers can increase the cost of
contracting.  For example, when a partial entitlement is given to a person who is not the efficient
owner, she will only be a potential seller, and her traditional incentive to seek an inflated price can
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impede negotiations among the class of potentially highest valuers.  The low entitlement valuers who
are mistakenly granted a claim on the entitlement can inefficiently hold up the transaction.131  This
is another example of what Heller called the anti-commons problem -- where too many people can
block the transfer of an entitlement to its highest valuing owner.132  As the pool of potentially high
valuers increases, liability rules (of both the single chooser and dual chooser varieties) can
exacerbate this hold up or anti-commons problem.
E.  Cognitive Bias and Wealth Effects
A central finding of the previous analysis concerned the allocative invariance of all
implementations within a particular foundational allocative class.  For example, we claimed that any
defendant choice rule with a particular allocative price (D∆) would produce identical allocations for
any possible sets of private plaintiff and defendant valuations.  This invariance results only holds
true, however, in the absence of wealth and cognitive framing effects.
As with the Coase theorem's invariance prediction,133 our allocative invariance finding will
not hold true if the chooser's willingness to pay is affected by her overall wealth.134  Defendant
choice rules that allocate larger expected payoffs to the defendant might make the defendant more
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or less willing to pay a particular allocative price in allocating the entitlement to itself.
More generally, the allocative invariance result will be qualified to the extent that the
chooser's willingness to pay is different than the chooser's willingness to accept.  For both cognitive
and wealth effect reasons, it is often the case that a particular chooser will demand a higher price
when selling an entitlement than she would be willing to pay if forced to buy.135  As Saul Levmore
has noted in discussing put options:
Armed with the legal right to be free of pollution, [a Resident] might have demanded
$1,000,000, for example before allowing [a Polluter] to send effluents her way, so
that [the Resident's] damages from [the Polluter's] operation can fairly be said to
amount to $1,000,000; but this does not mean that [the Resident] could or would pay
this amount to stop [the Polluter], if the law requires [the Resident] to pay in order
to [stop pollution].136
This suggests that there will be a range of prices (in Levmore’s example, say, between $700,000 and
$1,000,000) in which the plaintiff-resident would allocate the entitlement to itself under a put-option
implementation (Rule 6) but would allocate the entitlement to the defendant under a call-option
implementation (Rule 4).  For these intermediate damage amounts, the law's determination of an
initial entitlement holder will tend to be sticky.  This should not be surprising.  It has long been
known that endowment effects impede trade in the shadow of property rules; this result carries over
to option regimes as well.
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What is more controversial is whether lawmakers should privilege endowment effects in
cost-benefit calculus.  If a Resident values an entitlement (more than a Polluter) merely because she
is initially endowed with it, lawmakers might want to set a low call-option price to allow the Polluter
to take control of the entitlement and benefit from its own endowment effect.  One goal -- to be
traded off against other equity goals -- would be to produce a legal regime where the entitlement
flowed to the person who would have the highest willingness to accept.137  From an efficiency
standpoint, this standard would rank people by their value of "having" rather than their value of "not
having."  Other things being equal, this standard would lead toward giving the initial entitlement to
the party with the larger endowment effect.
The proliferation of different single chooser rules -- including the call, put, "Pay or be Paid,"
and "Pay or Pay" implementations -- is, again, that they can help lawmakers accommodate competing
concerns.  When cognitive or wealth effect reasons cause these implementations to be allocatively
different, policymakers will at least have more flexibility for trading off a variety of efficiency and
equity concerns.  Efficiency consideration might militate toward giving the initial entitlement to the
party with the larger endowment effect.  But if this is the party that the court believes is also the more
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efficient chooser, then the court can accommodate both efficiency concerns by giving the party both
the initial entitlement and a put option.
But most basically, more work needs to be done to see the extent to which an endowment
effect persists under the various implementations of single chooser (and dual chooser) rules.  The
path-breaking mug experiments of Kahneman, Knetsh and Thaler only tested whether entitlements
protected by property rules gave rise to endowment effects.138  It is much less clear whether
endowments protected by liability rules–i.e., subject to someone else's call option–give rise to the
same effect.  In the shadow of a call option, the initial entitlement holder has a more transient, less
secure claim to the entitlement and, thus, may not establish the cognitive bond that in part may give
rise to the effect.  In fact, Jeff Rachlinski and Forest Jourden have recently conducted experiments
showing that the endowment effect is largely extinguished in the shadow of traditional liability (call
option) rules.139  However, put options or other intermediate implementations (such as the "Pay or
be Paid" rule) may produce different endowment effects.  One possibility is that put option rules
would heighten the endowment effect.  Put-option implementations give the initial entitlement
holder even more control over her "endowment" than traditional property rules, and this may enhance
the solidity of ownership.140  If the endowment effect is seen as a source of real value that we want
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to nurture -- as opposed to a "status quo bias" or "framing effect" that we want to overcome141 – then
put options may be a way to overcome the inefficiencies of the holdup problem in bilateral monopoly
settings without destroying the "value of having."  More generally, the infinity of single choice rules
discovered here gives policymakers more flexibility in testing for and managing the pros and cons
of cognitive bias.
F.  Correlated Valuations
Our foregoing analysis has assumed that the litigants’ valuations are independently
distributed.  While this assumption is plausible in some contexts,142 Kaplow and Shavell have
pointed out that a plaintiff’s and defendant’s valuation of physical objects may be correlated.143  If
a plaintiff places a high value on an oilfield or laptop computer, there are good reasons to think that
a defendant’s value may be positively correlated.  
Correlated valuations make it more difficult for courts to use liability rules to harness the
parties’ private information.  For example, Kaplow and Shavell have shown that if the litigants’
overall valuation can be decomposed into a “common-value” and an “idiosyncratic-value”
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component,144 then it will be difficult for courts to set a damage amount that induces takings that tend
to increase social welfare.  For example, suppose that (i) the litigants’ common-value component is
uniformly distributed between $0 and $100; (ii) the plaintiff’s idiosyncratic-value component is
uniformly and independently distributed between $0 and $100; and, (iii) the defendant’s
idiosyncratic-value component is uniformly and independently distributed between $0 and $75.  A
traditional liability rule (Rule 2) with damages set equal to the plaintiff’s mean valuation of $100
($50 mean common value plus $50 mean idiosyncratic value) will be less efficient than giving the
plaintiff the entitlement protected by a property rule (Rule 1).  
When the litigants’ valuations are positively correlated it is difficult for the court’s allocative
price to distinguish between unexpectedly high realizations of the common-value component versus
unexpectedly high realizations of the idiosyncratic-value component.  Rule 2 with $100 damages
would induce the defendant in the foregoing example to take too often.  For example when the
common-value component turned out to be $80, a defendant would take if its idiosyncratic value
were as low as $20 – even though such takings would be inefficient (as the defendant’s mean
idiosyncratic value is $50).145  
Restated in the terms of this article, Kaplow and Shavell have suggested that when the
litigants’ valuations are substantially correlated the optimal delegation is no delegation.  It is better
DELEGATION AND DECOUPLING
146See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values and the Law (working paper 2001).
96
for the courts to allocate the entitlement via a property rule rather than to delegate the allocative
decision to the litigants via a liability rule.
But while Kaplow and Shavell are correct that correlated valuations make it more difficult
to harness private valuations, they are wrong to conclude that property rules dominate liability rules
when valuations are positively correlated.  In a separate essay, we show that the examples in their
original article systematically overstate the advantages of property rules by comparing the more
efficient property rule to a liability rule that has non-optimal damages and the less efficient
chooser.146  But for now, it is useful to see how nicely dual chooser rules can respond to the
correlated value problem. 
Remember that the problem with a traditional liability rule (Rule 2) is that the defendant may
take – not because she has a high idiosyncratic value – but merely because both litigants’ have an
unexpectedly high common-value realization.  The court would like the defendant only to take if its
idiosyncratic value is unexpectedly high, but the court can’t observe either the common or
idiosyncratic-value components. It can only set a single damage figure which might induce a
defendant to take either because it has an unexpectedly high idiosyncratic value (efficient takings)
or because both it and the plaintiff have an unexpectedly high common value (inefficient taking).
But while the court cannot observe whether the defendant is taking because of a high common value,
the plaintiff can.  
Dual chooser rules are well suited to respond to the problem of correlated valuations because
these rules allow the other side to veto takings that are driven by common-value realizations.  The
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problem with Rule 2 in the foregoing example was that defendants might take merely because the
common-value component was unexpectedly high.  But a defendant-joint-veto rule eliminates this
problem by allowing the plaintiff to veto takings that are driven by both parties having a high
common value.  Under a defendant-joint-veto rule, the entitlement will only be allocated to the
defendant if the plaintiff’s total value (common plus idiosyncratic) is less than the damage amount
and if the defendant’s total (common plus idiosyncratic) is greater than the damage amount.  Indeed,
in the foregoing example it can be shown that the optimal dual-chooser rule produces systematically
higher expected joint payoffs than the optimal property rule.147  Thus, while correlated valuations
make optimal delegation a more difficult judicial task, one or two private heads can still be better
than none. 
G.  Bargaining
Probably the most serious qualification to our foregoing analysis concerns our assumption
of autarky.  Our formal model assumes that the litigants cannot bargain with each other -- and
considers instead the equilibrium allocation and distribution absent negotiations.  This assumption
can be given two partial defenses, but ultimately much more work needs to be done to understand
how liability rules should be strucutred in a world where transaction costs are relatively small.  In
this section, we sketch these two partial defenses for our autarky assumption and then show how dual
chooser rules induce a new type of information forcing that may militate toward their use when
transaction costs are relatively low.
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The first partial defense of an autarky assumption is basically empirical.  There are at least
some bilateral contexts in which the disputants seem extremely reluctant to even negotiate much less
agree to contract.  Ward Farnsworth, for example, surveyed the interactions between nuisance
disputants after an initial trial decision and found almost without exception that the litigants and their
attorneys failed to even consider negotiating in the shadow of the law.148  Enmity between the
litigants may produce an important barrier to trade -- an thus inhibit private contract as a means of
allocation.
Secondly, an understanding of how liability rules perform when trade is not feasible may
provide valuable insights into the relative efficiency of these rules when bargaining is possible.  The
autarkic payoffs that we have analyzed above become the threat points that will deeply influence the
litigants' bargaining strategies.  Negotiation theorists also at times refer to such autarkic payoffs of
the individual litigants as representing their “reservation prices” for trade or their “BATNAs” (“best
alternative to negotiated agreement”).149  Because litigants can’t be forced through consensual trade
to accept less than their BATNA, our previous showings of how judges can vary the distribution of
payoffs will continue to hold true in a world where bargaining is feasible.  For example, by adopting
a defendant choice rule that is implemented with a relatively high alpha (a “Pay or be Paid” rule),
the court can, even with bargaining, assure the plaintiff a higher expected return and the defendant
a lower expected return than a defendant choice rule implemented with a put option (Rule 5).
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Kaplow and Shavell, however, have gone further to argue that legal regimes that are
relatively more efficient in allocating the entitlement when bargaining is not possible are likely to
continue to be more efficient as transaction costs subside and bargaining becomes feasible. Of
course, the Coase theorem teaches that all contractible legal regimes (property, single chooser, dual
chooser, etc.) will be equally efficient in allocating when transaction costs are nil.  But Kaplow and
Shavell have argued that the relative efficiency of different rules when bargaining is not possible will
tend to persist when bargaining is possible (but not perfect).150  Under this persistence conjecture,
the non-consensual advantage that, say, a defendant choice rule might have (when the litigants’ mean
valuations are similar and the variance of the defendant’s valuation is greater than the plaintiff’s)
relative to the other three single-price allocations would be likely to persist if the parties could
bargain.  For Kaplow and Shavell, the non-consensual headstart that a particular rule has over others
in promoting allocative efficiency is likely on average to persist as transaction costs recede and trade
becomes possible.
If the persistence conjecture is true, then the foregoing analysis would be the end of the story.
By knowing how best to tailor rules when bargaining was prohibited, judges would perforce know
how best to tailor rules when bargaining was allowed.  Unfortunately, we are not convinced that the
persistence conjecture is the entire story.  While it is surely the case that the most efficient liability
rule under autarchy has a headstart when bargaining is permitted, it is at least possible that other,
consensual attributes of the rules may come to dominate the non-consensual attributes.  We know,
for example, that the persistence conjecture is at most a tendency because Ayres and Talley have
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provided a numerical counterexample in which the non-consensual advantage of property rules over
liability did not persist once bargaining was allowed.151  Moreover, these authors showed that
liability rules have a much stronger “information-forcing” effect than property rules.  This
information forcing represents a potential “consensual advantage” of liability rules that may be much
more important in determining the relative efficiency of different legal regimes when bargaining
costs are low than the non-consensual advantage that Kaplow and Shavell have emphasized.
In terms of the foregoing analysis, single-chooser rules give the non-chooser a robust
incentive to reveal through bargaining whether her value is above or below her mean valuation.  For
example, imagine that a court announces a defendant choice (call option) rule in which the defendant
can allocate the entitlement to itself if it pays the plaintiff $1 million (the plaintiff’s estimated mean
valuation).  The plaintiff can respond by either trying to (a) sell the entitlement (for less than $1
million) or (b) buy the defendant’s call option (in essence trying to bribe the defendant not to take
non-consensually).  The plaintiff as a non-chooser will only offer to pay the defendant money not
to take if its valuation is higher than the court’s estimate of its valuation, and it will only offer to sell
the underlying entitlement if it’s valuation is lower than the court’s estimate of its mean valuation.
By merely expressing an interest in one type of trade or the other, the non-chooser can credibly signal
whether her value is higher or lower than the court’s estimate of her mean.152  Plaintiff-choice rules
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analogously give the defendant as non-chooser a robust incentive to credibly signal whether its
valuation is higher or lower than it’s mean by again merely signaling in which type of trade it is
interested.
If the parties' imperfect information is the primary barrier to trade, it is at least possible that
these information-forcing effects will dominate the non-consensual advantages of different liability
rules outlined above.  In particular, it is clear that in the absence of bargaining the more efficient
chooser will tend to be the litigant with the more speculative valuation.  But when bargaining is
allowed, it is at least possible that the more efficient chooser will be the party with the less
speculative valuation -- as the negotiation will quickly allow the high variance litigant to narrow her
distribution by credibly signaling whether she has a relatively high or low valuation.  To date, we
have not succeeded in producing an example in which, when bargaining was allowed, the litigant
with the less speculative valuation became the more efficient chooser.  But at a minimum, the
information-forcing effect on the non-chooser systematically narrows the allocative efficiency
difference between the two single-choice rules. 
The question of whether our autarkic results persist with bargaining, becomes all the more
interesting when we add to the mix the possibility of dual chooser rules.  It turns out that dual
chooser rules have arguably an even stronger information-forcing effect than single chooser rules.
While single chooser rules give one of the litigants (the non-chooser) an ability to signal whether it
has a relatively high or low valuation, dual chooser rules give both litigants an opportunity to
credibly signal whether they have a high or a low value by merely signaling their interest in a
particular type of trade.
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option.  But the information forcing stressed in the text allows the defendant to signal its high
valuation even before it is called upon to exercise its first stage option.
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Consider, for example, a defendant-joint-veto situation implemented through a call/call
option regime in which the plaintiff receives (a) the initial entitlement plaintiff (b) subject to a
defendant’s call option (with an exercise price of D∆JV) but (c) also has an option to take back the
entitlement (a call option with an exercise price of D∆JV).  In the absence of bargaining, the
defendant-joint-veto allocation gives rise to two types of inefficiencies.  The first type of inefficiency
occurs when the defendant has the higher valuation but the plaintiff nonetheless vetoes a defendant
allocation by exercising its take back option.  This occurs when v∆ > vΠ >D∆JV.  And the Coasean
solution would be for the defendant to buy the plaintiff’s take back (call) option.  The second type
of inefficiency occurs when the defendant has the higher valuation but the defendant nonetheless
vetoes a defendant allocation by not exercising its initial call option.  This occurs when D∆JV > v∆
> vΠ.  And the Coasean solution for this inefficiency would be for the defendant to buy the
underlying entitlement (for some price less than D∆JV).
The defendant, when negotiating in the shadow of this legal rule, can credibly signal that it
has a relatively high value (v∆ > D∆JV) by merely expressing an interest in being willing to pay the
plaintiff not to exercise its take back option.153  Conversely, the plaintiff could credibly signal that
it has a relatively low value (vΠ < D∆JV) by merely expressing an interest in selling it’s entitlement
for a price less than D∆JV.  Low value defendants would never have a strategic reason for expressing
an interest in buying – much less actually offering to buy -- the plaintiff’s take back option.  And
high value plaintiffs would never have a strategic reason for expressing an interest in selling – much
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less actually offering to sell – their entitlement for a price less than D∆JV.  Thus dual chooser rules
create some opportunity for both litigants to credibly communicate their relative valuations through
the process of negotiation.  
Just as the possibility of correlated litigant valuations expanded the set of circumstances in
which dual chooser rules were allocatively dominant, the arguably stronger information-forcing
properties of dual chooser rules may further militate toward their use as trade, in the shadow of these
rules, becomes more feasible.  A full analysis of liability rules when transaction costs (including
imperfect information) are low but not zero has eluded scholars.  It may be that the particular ranking
of rules’ efficiency will turn not just on the general characteristics of the litigants’ value distributions
but on the specifics of the bargaining procedures that are assumed.
In this section, we have tried to argue that autarkic results are of interest because (a)
empirically some bilateral disputants face high transaction costs, (b) the non-consensual headstart
that we have identified may tend to persist when bargaining is possible, and (c) the autarkic payoffs
that we have derived become the threat points that will deeply inform the bargaining behavior of the
parties.  Our finding that dual chooser rules have different and arguably stronger information-forcing
effects than those previously identified for single chooser rules suggests, however, that the autarkic
analysis may not be the complete story.  On this dimension we are forced to repeat the hackneyed
and unsatisfactory conclusion that more research on this issue is warranted. 
CONCLUSION
While we have often motivated our analysis with a nuisance example, this article is really
about a deeper and more canonical problem about how courts should allocate rivalrous entitlements
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when the court has poorer information than the litigants about who is the higher-valuing owner.
Most basically, we have been envisioning a conflict in which the court -- even after discovery and
an adversarial trial -- only has a probabilistic assessment of each litigant's value, whereas each
litigant knows (or at least has better information) about how much she values the entitlement.  In
such a basic bilateral dispute with imperfect judicial information, the court faces a non-trivial
problem of how to best allocate claims to the entitlement.
When the private litigants are better informed than the court, it will be useful for the court
to adopt an allocative rule that harnesses some of the litigants’ private information.   This article has
shown that there are four basic allocations from which courts may choose.  The traditional liability
rules -- Rules 2 and 4 -- exemplify two of these equilibria -- the plaintiff choice and defendant choice
rules.  But we have shown that there are two other dual chooser rules which not only have common
law analogs but which, under specific circumstances, can produce greater allocative efficiency than
single chooser rules.
Moreover, we have shown there are infinite number of implementations of each type of rule
which are allocatively equivalent but which allow the court to distribute the total expected payoff
of the litigants as it sees fit.  This means that courts, in resolving bilateral disputes, can decouple
allocative and distributive concerns.  By selecting the more efficient chooser or choosers and by
setting the efficient allocative price, a court can maximize ex post allocative efficiency.  And
independent of these core allocative decisions the court has a free hand to distribute the expected
payoffs as it wants.  Thus, distributively-concerned courts are free to pursue equity or promote ex
ante efficiency without sacrificing the natural desire to see that the entitlement ends up in the hands
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154See Epstein, supra note 7; Rose, supra note 7; Ayres & Talley, supra note 7.
155Ayres & Talley, supra note 7, at 1743.
156Even under the call implementation, its not clear why this argument makes sense.  If Krier
at the time of investment does not yet know what his valuation will be, then promising him his mean
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of the highest valuing user (the ex post allocative efficiency concern).  We take this decoupling result
and our analysis of dual chooser rules to be our central findings.
 While we have focused on how courts should structure liability rules, our analysis does have
implications for the equally important choice of when courts should opt for liability rules over
property rules.  Legal scholars have generated a number of rationales for why property rules might
dominate liability rules.154  We focus here on three rationales for property rules that are qualified by
the foregoing analysis.  One of the oldest rationales was that property rules are better at inducing
trade than liability rules when transaction costs were relatively low.  Ayres and Talley seriously
undermined this rationale by showing that liability rules have a greater information-forcing effect
than property rules and providing examples in which liability rules were more effective in inducing
trade.  And this article has furthered this criticism by showing that dual chooser rules also have new
and potentially stronger information-forcing qualities that may give dual chooser rules a consensual
advantage over property rules.
As a second rationale, many authors (including Ayres and Talley)155 have argued that property
rules give individuals better ex ante investment incentives to create the disputed entitlement to begin
with.  The idea here is that Krier is less likely to build a new house if Schwab has the option to take
non-consensually and pay Krier’s mean valuation.  But this result only makes sense if we limit our
attention to the call implementations of liability rules.156  The foregoing decoupling result shows that
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valuation should not deter his investment – indeed, if he is risk averse it may decrease the variance
in his payoffs and make him more willing to invest.  However, if Krier at the time of investing
knows what his future valuation will be, then promising him his mean valuation (should Schwab
take) may deter him from some valuable types of investment when his actual value will turn out to
be higher than the court’s perceived mean value.
157Conversely, choosers may allocate the entitlement to the non-chooser, not because their
idiosyncratic value for the entitlement is low, but because the common-value element of the
entitlement's value takes on an unexpectedly low value which falls short of the court's allocative
price.
158Even though, as we note above, supra at 94, Kaplow and Shavell fail to compare the
property rule to the most efficient single chooser rule -- because their example uses the less efficient
chooser and non-optimal damages.
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there are both single chooser and dual chooser implementations that can allocate even greater
expected payoffs to either litigant than can be allocated in the absence of bargaining under a property
rule regime.  The decoupling result seriously qualifies the investment rationale for using property
rules because it suggests that courts both retain the ex post (information-harnessing) benefits of
liability rules without undermining ex ante investment incentives.
Finally, and most recently, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that property rules will tend to
dominate liability rules when the litigants’ valuations are correlated.  They argue that liability rules
will tend to be less efficient because chooser will allocate the entitlement to themselves not because
their idiosyncratic value for the entitlement is high, but because the common-value element of the
entitlement's value takes on an unexpectedly high value which exceeds the court’s allocative price.157
Their analysis makes eminent sense in comparing the relative efficiency of property rules to single
chooser rules,158 but as we showed above, there analysis was limited because it did not consider the
possibility of dual choice rules.  Dual choice rules, by giving both litigants a veto over certain
allocations, can better select for circumstances when the idiosyncratic and not common value is
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159Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 214;  Epstein, supra note 9, at 2195; and Rose, supra note
9, at 2180.
160To begin, the absence of contract law from Calabresi and Melamed’s view of the cathedral
is striking.  The subject might have been omitted because contracts didn’t fit their theory well.
Calabresi and Melamed have been understood by subsequent scholars to have argued that liability
rules tend to dominate when transaction costs are high, but that property rules dominate when
transaction costs are low.  Contractual entitlements don’t fit because they are protected by liability
rules even though transaction costs were sufficiently low for the parties to enter into an initial
contract.
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driving the allocative choice.  
In sum, the option analysis of liability rules tends to increasingly tilt as a theoretical matter
toward the use of liability rules.  In some sense this is a natural byproduct of entering more liability
rule horses in the race to compete against the two property rule stalwarts (Rules 1 and 3).  Still, there
are strong reasons why property rules will at times dominate,159 but this article and other recent
efforts have made progress on identifying narrower but firmer grounds on which property rules can
stake their dominance.  But when liability rules dominate, lawmakers would be well advised to
consider the fuller panoply of implementations than merely the call option rules of Calabresi and
Melamed.  
To get a fuller sense of why other implementations of the four basic allocations might be
useful, it is useful in closing to speculate on how the foregoing analysis might be applied to breach
of contract.160  Contractual entitlements are normally protected by a single type of liability rule.  The
promisor has a call option on the promisee’s entitlement to performance.  The promisor by breaching
can take the promisee’s entitlement to performance and merely pay compensatory damages set at the
court’s best estimate of the promisee’s value of performance.  Thus, unless the extraordinary damage
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161Ayres & Balkin, supra note 15, at 746.
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of specific performance is due, the standard remedy implements (in nuisance terminology) a kind
of Rule 2.  Recharacterized in this way, we can see that contract law lags behind the state of nuisance
law because while at least one court (in Spur) has implemented Calabresi and Melamed’s Rule 4,
contract courts do not give promisees the choice of whether they prefer performance or to receive
damages.
Contract remedies are infirm for placing the allocative authority solely in the hands of the
promisor.  True expectations damages, as an implementation of a defendant choice rule, can induce
the defendant to breach efficiently – given her private information about the costs of breach.  But the
foregoing analysis suggests that, at times, the plaintiff will be the better chooser to decide whether
performance should take place, or at still other times both the plaintiff and the defendant will make
better allocative decisions (than either one or the other could do by herself).  The traditional
expectation damage rule does a good job of harnessing the defendant/promisor’s private information,
but does not harness the information of the plaintiff/promisee.  At times (particularly when the
litigants have similar variances but different means) the court would do better to implement a dual
chooser rule by announcing an allocative price and then giving each party the opportunity to veto the
defendant’s breach.  
Or, as an alternative, it might be useful to give the promisee the option of increasing the
damages she would receive for the promisor’s breach by making a firm offer to pay more for
performance.161  Thus, after a seller anticipatorilly repudiated a contract, a court might give the buyer
the option of offering the seller an additional amount to perform.  The seller could either accept this
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162Buyer’s ability to enhance the seller’s potential damages should be limited to
circumstances in which performance was feasible.  Otherwise, buyers might make an inflated offer
(i.e., an offer that exceeds their private values for performance) if they know that changed
circumstances have rendered the seller’s performance impossible.  See id, at 747 n. 137.
163Buyers deciding how much to offer to induce performance would have a powerful
incentive not to offer too much.  If the offer were too generous, the seller would simply accept it and
perform.
164See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the
Reality, 33 Idea 349 (1987) (noting that blocking patents are one of the three most common
conditions for compulsory licensing abroad).  Countries that have compulsory licenses for blocking
patents include Australia, China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Switzerland.  See
Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Improvement
Inventions and Blocking Patents 30-31 (1994).  U.S. patent law also mandates compulsory licenses
with regard to nuclear power and environmental engineering technologies.  See Ayres & Talley,
supra note 15, at 1093.
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amount and perform, or breach the contract and pay ordinary damages plus the additional amount
that the buyer offered to pay.162  Judges could implement this scheme by instructing a jury to
determine ordinary expectation damages (without knowledge of the attempted modification), and
then simply adding the enhancement to the jury’s award.  This mechanism would allow the
plaintiff/buyer to credibly signal when her value of performance was higher than the provable mean
valuation.163  The defendant/seller would then face a truer allocative price in deciding whether to
breach.  
Both contract and nuisance law provide rich settings in which to apply our analysis, but there
are others as well.  For example, many countries use “compulsory licensing” schemes to mitigate the
bilateral monopoly problems of “blocking patents.”164  Compulsory licenses of course amount to a
call-option implementation of a single choice rule.  But by now it should be obvious that giving the
allocative choice to the other side or to two both sides in a block patent dispute might be superior
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(and that it might be useful to consider “Pay or be Paid” implementations to adjust the expected
distribution). At the end of the day, bilateral disputes over rivalrous entitlements do not come close
to describing the "cathedral" of allocative dilemmas facing courts, but they represent a substantial
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